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INTRODUCTION 
In February 2012, more than 5700 individuals boycotted 
a leading multinational corporation and successfully derailed 
a legislative initiative that would have significantly 
benefitted the industry.1  Who were the individuals 
 
 1. Thomas Lin, Mathematicians Organize Boycott of a Publisher, N.Y. 
TIMES, February 14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/14/science/ 
researchers-boycott-elsevier-journal-publisher.html?_r=0. 
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responsible for this remarkable demonstration of grassroots 
political muscle?  Environmental activists?  Opponents of 
corporate globalization?  Self-proclaimed representatives of 
the ninety-nine percent?  No, the group that successfully 
stared down this multi-billion dollar global enterprise 
consisted mostly of mathematicians and other natural 
scientists.2  The focus of their boycott: Elsevier, the world’s 
largest publisher of scientific journals.3 
Led by some of the most prominent names in 
mathematics, the protesters objected to Elsevier’s spiraling 
prices and its push to abolish a policy whereby scientific 
articles funded by the U.S. National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) are made publicly available.4  The boycott pressured 
Elsevier to withdraw its support for the bill, called the 
Research Works Act, and ultimately led to its demise.5  
Though the proposed Research Works Act was the immediate 
cause of the Elsevier boycott, the uprising by scientists is 
symptomatic of a much deeper and longer conflict within the 
scientific community.  As observed by Ingrid Daubechies, 
president of the International Mathematical Union, the 
boycott arose because the “social compact [between scientists 
and publishers] is broken.”6 
In the 1940s, sociologist Robert K. Merton famously 
identified four fundamental norms that characterize both the 
practice and culture of science.  Among these is the 
willingness of scientists to share their discoveries and 
findings freely.7  While the motivations that lead scientists to 
share, as well as the practical difficulties inherent in this 
activity, have been debated since Merton’s day, there is little 
argument that the accessibility of scientific findings is critical 
to the advancement of scientific progress.8  In addition, the 
 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Research Works Act, H.R. 3699, 112th Cong. (2011) (introduced by 
Representatives Issa and Maloney on December 16, 2011). 
 5. The bill’s co-sponsors withdrew it in February 2012.  Jennifer Howard, 
Legislation to Bar Public-Access Requirement on Federal Research is Dead, 
CHRON. HIGHER ED., Feb. 27, 2012, http://chronicle.com/article/Legislation-to-
Bar/130949/. 
 6. Lin, supra note 1. 
 7. ROBERT K. MERTON, The Normative Structure of Science (1942), in THE 
SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 267–78 (Norman W. Storer ed., 1973). 
 8. Such acknowledgements abound in the literature.  E.g., Scott Aaronson 
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sharing of data enables scientists to validate and 
independently verify the findings, analyses, and conclusions 
of their colleagues.9  As a result, the sharing of scientific 
information contributes to overall social welfare.10  But 
despite the acknowledged importance of sharing scientific 
information, the ability of scientists to access information 
relevant to their fields has come under increasing pressure. 
The most prominent means of disseminating results in 
the sciences is, and has been for more than three centuries, 
publication in peer-reviewed scientific journals.11  Prior to 
 
et al., The Cost of Knowledge (2012), available at http://gowers.files. 
wordpress.com/2012/02/elsevierstatementfinal.pdf  (statement of thirty-four 
prominent mathematicians protesting the practices of Elsevier). 
 9. See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., ENSURING THE INTEGRITY, ACCESSIBILITY, 
AND STEWARDSHIP OF RESEARCH DATA IN THE DIGITAL AGE 59 (2009) (“Only 
when a researcher shares data and results with other researchers can the 
accuracy of the data, analyses, and conclusions be verified.”); Paul David, The 
Economic Logic of “Open Science” and the Balance between Private Property 
Rights and the Public Domain in Scientific Data and Information: A Primer, in 
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE ROLE OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DATA 
AND INFORMATION IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: PROCEEDINGS OF A SYMPOSIUM 21 
(2003) (“Disclosure . . . creates an expectation that all claims to have 
contributed to the stock of reliable knowledge will be subjected to trials of 
verification, without insult to the claimant.”). 
 10. For the sake of argument, I will assume that scientific discoveries, by 
and large, are socially beneficial.  I recognize but avoid the thorny debate over 
the desirability and social utility of research in some controversial fields (e.g., 
human cloning, embryonic stem cells, biological warfare, genetic modification of 
organisms, nuclear fission/fusion, cryogenics, and the like). 
     Moreover, I intentionally avoid the question of whether maintaining 
discoveries as secret, as opposed to sharing them, can lead to greater 
innovation, particularly in industrial settings.  For a discussion of the role of 
secrecy in innovation, see J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 917, 928–31 (2011).  For purposes of this paper, I abide by the 
generally-held assumption that scientific progress is more typically advanced by 
disclosure, rather than concealment, of discoveries.  And in any case, the 
discoveries addressed in this paper are ones that scientists have intentionally 
submitted for publication, evidencing their own preference for disclosure over 
secrecy.  Any subsequent limitations on access to these discoveries by journals 
are imposed by the policies and financial considerations of journals rather than 
scientists. 
 11. See MERTON, supra note 7, at 325, 337 (“From its very beginning, the 
journal of science introduced the institutional device of quick publication to 
motivate men of science to replace the value set upon secrecy with the value 
placed upon the open disclosure of the knowledge they had created.” (footnote 
omitted)); JOHN M. ZIMAN, PROMETHEUS BOUND: SCIENCE IN A DYNAMIC 
STEADY STATE 39 (1994) (arguing that the peer-reviewed publication process is 
“at the very core of academic science” and “inseparable from its other 
functions”). 
3_CONTRERAS FINAL.DOC 7/23/2013  9:25 PM 
2013] THE CRISIS IN SCIENTIFIC PUBLISHING 495 
 
World War II, scientific journals were published primarily by 
learned societies organized and governed by members of the 
scientific community.12  Today, what was once a cottage 
industry is dominated by a handful of commercial publishers 
that control a market valued at between $7 billion13 and $10 
billion annually.14  The ascendancy of commercial publishers 
in scientific publishing began in the late 1950s and has had 
several notable effects. 
First, the number of journals catering to specialized sub-
disciplines expanded rapidly.  In 1960, it has been estimated 
that roughly 2800 scientific journals were in print.15  Today, 
estimates place the number somewhere between 16,00016 and 
24,00017 journals. 
Second, between 1975 and 1995, publishers significantly 
increased subscription rates for scientific journals and began 
to bundle titles into expensive packages offered to libraries at 
a single hefty rate.18  Increases were at levels far in excess of 
inflation and resulted in subscription rates significantly 
above those of non-profit journals.19  As a result, the cost of 
 
 12. What is generally regarded as the first scientific journal, the 
Philosophical Transactions, was launched by the British Royal Society in 1665.  
Philosophical Transactions—the World's First Science Journal, 
PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS, http://rstl.royalsocietypublishing.org/ (last 
visited Apr. 25, 2013).  Today many journals, including the prestigious title 
Science published by the American Association for the Advancement of Science 
(AAAS), are still published by learned societies.  About AAAS: What is AAAS?, 
AAAS, http://www.aaas.org/aboutaaas/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2013). 
 13. EPS, Changing Business in Scientific, Technical and Medical Publishing 
Marketplace 2 (2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/ 
32145392.pdf. 
 14. Scientific, Technical & Medical: Research Reports, MARKET 
RESEARCH.COM, http://www.marketresearch.com/Technology-Media-c1599 
/Media-c92/Scientific-Technical-Medical-c1661/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2013). 
 15. Carol Tenopir & Donald W. King, Toward Electronic Journals: Realities 
for Scientists, Librarians, and Publishers, 11 PSYCOLOQUY 1, para. 7 (2000), 
available at http://www.cogsci.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?11.084. 
 16. Access All Areas, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 5, 2004, 
http://www.economist.com/node/3061258. 
 17. Manon A. Ress, Open-Access Publishing: From Principles to Practice, in 
ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 475, 477 
(Gaëlle Krikorian & Amy Kapczynski eds., 2010). 
 18. EUROPEAN COMM’N, STUDY ON THE ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL 
EVOLUTION OF THE SCIENTIFIC PUBLICATION MARKETS IN EUROPE: FINAL 
REPORT 23–24 (2006). 
 19. See Carl T. Bergstrom & Theodore C. Bergstrom, The Costs and Benefits 
of Library Site Licenses to Academic Journals, 101 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 897 
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subscribing to many journals, particularly those in 
specialized technical fields,20 became prohibitive to all but the 
largest institutions.  What followed was a widespread 
reduction in subscription volume by academic libraries of all 
sizes.21  Even Harvard University, arguably the wealthiest 
academic research institution in the world, recently 
announced that continuing its subscriptions to the full range 
of scientific journals at an annual cost of $3.75 million would 
be “financially untenable.”22 
This period of sustained price increases, which continues 
today,23 and the accompanying cancellation of journal 
subscriptions by academic libraries has been termed the 
serials crisis.  The serials crisis prompted a widely-voiced 
concern among libraries, scientists, and public interest 
advocates that researchers were being deprived of access to 
the latest developments in their fields, thereby adversely 
 
(2004).  Harvard University estimates that online journal subscriptions from 
two major publishers have escalated by 145% over a six-year period.  
Memorandum from the Harvard University Faculty Advisory Council to Faculty 
Members in all Schools, Faculties, and Units, Major Periodical Subscriptions 
Cannot be Sustained (April 17, 2012) [hereinafter Harvard FAC Memo], 
available at http://isites.harvard.edu/icb/icb.do?keyword=k77982&tabgroupid 
=icb.tabgroup143448.  In response, Elsevier reports that its print list price 
increases have averaged only five percent per year.  Ian Sample, Harvard 
University Says it Can’t Afford Journal Publishers’ Prices, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 
24, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2012/apr/24/harvard-university-
journal-publishers-prices. 
 20. According to one study, the average subscription cost of commercially-
published journals in the field of economics in 2001 was over $1600.  Theodore 
C. Bergstrom, Free Labor for Costly Journals?, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 183 (2001).  
Specialist publications, particularly in the medical literature, can cost in the 
range of $20,000 per year.  Pamela Burdman, A Quiet Revolt Puts Costly 
Journals on Web, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com 
/2004/06/26/arts/a-quiet-revolt-puts-costly-journals-on-web.html?pagewanted 
=all&src=pm (citing the annual subscription rates of The Journal of 
Comparative Neurology ($17,995) and Brain Research ($21,269)).  Harvard 
University has reported that some journal subscriptions cost as much as 
$40,000 per year.  Harvard FAC Memo, supra note 19. 
 21. Though this trend affected institutions and scientists worldwide, its 
impact was felt most acutely at institutions in developing countries, some of 
which were unable to sustain subscriptions to any relevant scientific 
publications.  See JOHN WILLINSKY, THE ACCESS PRINCIPLE: THE CASE FOR 
OPEN ACCESS TO RESEARCH AND SCHOLARSHIP 25 (William Y. Arms ed., 2006). 
 22. Harvard FAC Memo, supra note 19. 
 23. See Aaronson et al., supra note 8; Mark McCabe & Christopher M. 
Snyder, The Economics of Open-Access Journals (2010) at 1, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=914525. 
3_CONTRERAS FINAL.DOC 7/23/2013  9:25 PM 
2013] THE CRISIS IN SCIENTIFIC PUBLISHING 497 
 
impacting their own research and teaching.24  An 
unawareness of the latest research findings makes it more 
likely that scientists will conduct research that is duplicative 
or that does not make use of the latest advances.  And access 
to the latest scientific literature is important not only for 
researchers, but also for professionals who require up-to-date 
technical knowledge in their fields.  For example, one recent 
study of healthcare workers (primarily physicians and 
nurses) found that a lack of access to current medical 
literature could have an impact on patient care.25  For all of 
these reasons, limiting access to scientific research findings is 
likely to have a negative impact on social welfare. 
In this Article, I propose a reallocation of rights between 
scientific authors and publishers in order to address the 
serials crisis and reduce the social welfare losses that it has 
occasioned.  In Part I, I review the nature of the scientific 
publishing market and the causes of the serials crisis.  In 
Parts II and III, I analyze existing proposals to address the 
crisis, including Steven Shavell’s recent proposal to abolish 
copyright in academic works and a number of open access 
publishing models that have gained some measure of market 
acceptance.  In Part IV, I turn to mandated open access 
approaches, including the U.S. NIH’s open access policy, and 
discuss the potential pitfalls of relying on governmental 
programs as long-term solutions.  In Part V, I describe the 
convergence of a number of existing open access efforts 
defined by particular time periods after which scientific 
literature is released to the public.  Using these latency 
periods as a basis, in Part VI, I propose that the most 
effective means of addressing the crisis in scientific 
publishing is to effect a shift in publishing norms using a 
broadly-adopted license agreement that eliminates the 
assignment of copyright to the publisher and allows only a 
one-year exclusivity period before the publication must be 
released to the public.  I argue that such a shift is possible 
 
 24. See generally WILLINSKY, supra note 21, at 13–37; Access All Areas, 
supra note 16. 
 25. See Jamie O’Keeffe, John Willinsky & Lauren Maggio, Public Access and 
Use of Health Research: An Exploratory Study of the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH) Public Access Policy Using Interviews and Surveys of Health 
Professionals, 13 J. MED. INTERNET RES. 4 (2011). 
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and has precedent in a similar shift that occurred in the 
academic legal publishing market through the efforts of 
academics in the 1990s. 
I. THE MAKING OF A CRISIS 
In this Section, I describe the development of the 
scientific publishing industry, particularly over the past 
twenty years, and how certain characteristics of the industry 
have led to the crisis that exists today.  In particular, I 
consider the role of copyright law in the publishing industry 
and the ways in which broad copyright protection has 
contributed to the serials crisis. 
A. The Traditional Model of Scientific Publishing 
Merton observes that an individual scientist’s rewards 
consist in large part of recognition and esteem, both of which 
are achieved through the communication of results to the 
scientific community.26  What’s more, the quantity and 
prestige of a researcher’s publications and the number of 
citations they receive from others are critical factors in 
securing scarce government grant funding.27  Thus, 
researchers have significant personal incentives, both 
reputational and financial, to publish their findings as 
quickly as possible.  The result is of personal benefit to 
researchers, but also confers benefits on society.28 
 
 
 26. Jonathan M. Barnett, The Illusion of the Commons, 25 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1751, 1800–01 (2010) (norms of scientific practice “mandate uncompensated 
forfeiture of private knowledge in exchange for the prospect of reputational 
prestige”); John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: 
Natural Products and Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101, 
155–56 (2001) (discussing motivations of scientists); MERTON, supra note 7, at 
274–75; see also NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 9, at 60 (“Researchers receive 
intellectual credit for their work and recognition from their peers . . . when they 
publish their results and share the data on which those results are based.”). 
 27. One NIH spokesperson has noted that “applicants with robust 
publication histories, [and] proven track records of scientific accomplishment . . 
. may have the edge over their younger, less experienced counterparts.”  Bob 
Grant, New NIH Forms Raise Concerns, THESCIENTIST.COM (Dec. 8, 2009), 
http://www.the-scientist.com/blog/display/56209/. 
 28. See NAT. RESEARCH COUNCIL, SHARING PUBLICATION-RELATED DATA 
AND MATERIALS: RESPONSIBILITIES OF AUTHORSHIP IN THE LIFE SCIENCES 34 
(2003) (“[T]he act of publishing is a quid pro quo in which authors receive credit 
and acknowledgement in exchange for disclosure of their scientific findings.”). 
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Nothing of value, of course, comes free, and the route to 
publication in a prestigious scientific journal is often difficult, 
time-consuming, and circuitous.  Once a researcher has made 
a finding deemed worthy of publication,29 he or she must 
write an article describing that finding together with 
supporting data, illustrations and the like.  The author then 
submits the article to the most prestigious journal that he or 
she deems likely to accept it.  The most selective and 
prestigious journals can publish only a small fraction of the 
thousands of articles submitted to them each year, and a 
scientist’s prominence and career advancement are 
dependent, in large part, on the number of publications that 
he or she places in highly regarded journals.30  Because most 
journals prohibit or strongly discourage simultaneous 
submissions, and because most journals’ review cycles take 
weeks or months, scientists have an incentive to target their 
papers to the highest-ranked journal with a realistic 
possibility of acceptance.31 
When a journal receives a submission, its editorial staff 
conducts an initial screening review.  Papers that do not meet 
editorial guidelines, either due to inappropriate subject 
matter (e.g., a paper on psychology that is submitted to an 
oceanography journal), the significance of their conclusions 
(e.g., a minor or incremental finding submitted to a highly-
ranked journal), poor writing, or failure to comply with 
 
 29. Because researchers are often rewarded for the sheer number of 
publications that they produce, they sometimes strive to squeeze as many 
papers as possible from a single project.  This practice has resulted in an 
increase in the total number of papers published, each of which consists of what 
is ironically referred to as a Least Publishable Unit (LPU).  William J. Broad, 
The Publishing Game: Getting More for Less, 211 SCIENCE 1137 (1981). 
 30. The Thomson Reuters Journal Citation Reports (JCR) assign impact 
factors to scientific journals based on a variety of factors including the number 
of citations received by articles published in those journals.  See RESEARCH 
INFO. NETWORK, TO SHARE OR NOT TO SHARE: PUBLICATION AND QUALITY 
ASSURANCE OF RESEARCH DATA OUTPUTS 25 (2008), available at 
http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/266742/1/Published_report_-_main_-_final.pdf (the 
assessment of researchers is “perceived to value above all else the publication of 
papers in high-impact journals”); ZIMAN, supra note 11, at 180 (noting that in 
terms of scientific success, “[o]ne paper with a hundred citations is worth 
infinitely more than a hundred papers with one citation each”). 
 31. This is in contrast to disciplines such as law, in which the cost and effort 
of simultaneously submitting a paper to multiple journals (often hundreds at 
once) is extremely low and which results in the highest-ranked journals being 
swamped with thousands of unsuitable papers for consideration. 
3_CONTRERAS FINAL.DOC 7/23/2013  9:25 PM 
500 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53 
 
formatting or other editorial requirements, are rejected 
quickly. 
If a paper appears to fall broadly within the journal’s 
guidelines, the staff editors may then submit it for review by 
an editorial board consisting of respected scientists in the 
field.  If the paper appears to be significant enough to 
publish, the editorial board will send it to two or more peer 
reviewers (also known as referees) for evaluation and 
comment.  Peer reviewers are selected based on their 
research interests, experience, prominence in the field, and 
often their own history of publishing with the journal.  Peer 
review can be conducted either blinded (the reviewers do not 
know the identity of the authors) or unblinded (the identities 
of the authors are known to the reviewers).  Reviewers, once 
selected, are asked by the journal to evaluate a submission 
based on its scientific merit, originality, significance and, if 
unblinded, the reputation of the authors.  Peer reviewers will 
seldom advise a journal to publish a paper as originally 
submitted.  Many papers, in fact, are rejected at this stage.  
But if a paper is deemed to be of potential publishable 
quality, reviewers will usually suggest a number of changes, 
both editorial and substantive, and, occasionally, will require 
additional experimentation or analysis.  The reviewers’ 
comments are returned by the journal to the author, who may 
then revise the paper to address the comments and, if 
necessary, gather additional data, refine the analysis, and 
revise the paper.  Once revised, the paper is resubmitted and 
the process is repeated until the paper is either accepted or 
rejected.  If the paper is rejected, either initially or after 
review, the author must select another journal and revise the 
paper to comply with that journal’s formatting, length, and 
editorial requirements.  This process is often repeated 
multiple times until the paper is finally accepted for 
publication by a journal. 
Once accepted, the journal’s editorial staff may edit and 
format the paper, check references, format figures and 
images, and otherwise prepare the accepted paper for 
publication.  One recent study reports that the period from 
completion of scientific work until publication is typically 
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between twelve and eighteen months.32  Other studies have 
found comparable or longer delay periods, depending on the 
field.33 
As time-consuming and frustrating as the journal 
submission and peer review process may be, journals are 
generally acknowledged to add value to the publication 
process.34  Among their primary contributions are quality 
control and selection, which they achieve both through their 
own editorial review and by coordinating the peer review 
process.  Busy working scientists have limited time to study 
the literature relevant to their fields and educate themselves 
regarding new developments and discoveries.  As a result, 
scientists rely on journals and journal reputation to organize 
and prioritize their intake of information and their limited 
capacity to read the current literature.35  Journals thus act as 
value-added intermediaries at several points between authors 
and readers.36 
 
 
 32. Carlos B. Amat, Editorial and Publication Delay of Papers Submitted to 
14 Selected Food Research Journals.  Influence of Online Posting, 74 
SCIENTOMETRICS 379 (2008). 
 33. See William D. Garvey & Belver C. Griffith, Scientific Information 
Exchange in Psychology, 146 SCIENCE 1655, 1656 (1964) (reporting that in the 
psychology field, their study indicated that the time between hypothesis and 
publication is between thirty and thirty-six months, and the time between 
reportable results and publication is between eighteen and twenty-one months); 
Charles G. Roland & Richard A. Kirkpatrick, Time Lapse Between Hypothesis 
and Publication in the Medical Sciences, 292 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1273, 1274 
(1975) (finding delays of twenty and twenty-four months between the 
completion of research and publication, respectively, for medical laboratory 
research and clinical research studies).  Anecdotally, the author has been 
informed that publication delays are typically even longer in the social sciences. 
 34. See, e.g., McCabe & Snyder, supra note 23. 
 35. One study shows that, on average, a scientist will only read between 100 
and 200 scientific articles per year from eighteen to twenty-six different 
journals, out of more than one million peer-reviewed scientific articles published 
annually.  Carol Tenopir & Donald W. King, The Use and Value of Scientific 
Journals: Past, Present and Future, 14 SERIALS 113–14, 117 (2001). 
 36. In economic terms, scientific publishers have been analyzed as 
intermediaries in a two-sided market, intermediating between authors on one 
side and readers on the other.  See McCabe & Snyder, supra note 23, at 4. 
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B. The (New) Economics of Scientific Publishing 
1. Cost 
The economic model enjoyed by scientific journals is 
fairly simple and enviable.  On the cost side, journals obtain 
the majority of their content for free.  Unlike publishers of 
general interest periodicals and newspapers, they employ 
few, if any, writers, reporters, and photographers.37  And 
unlike most book publishers, journals pay no author royalties.  
Rather, as described above, scientists submit their work to 
journals solely in exchange for intangible benefits such as 
reputational enhancement, career advancement, and 
improved odds of securing grant funding—benefits that are 
not funded directly by the journals.  What’s more, these same 
scientists perform a significant quality control and editorial 
function for the journals as peer reviewers.  Again, they 
donate their services without direct compensation to enhance 
their own relationships with journals and as inherent duties 
of their academic positions. 
Of course, journals do incur operational costs relating to 
submissions management, article screening, selection and 
coordination of peer reviewers, copy editing, art production, 
publication (both in print and online), marketing, and 
distribution.  After publication, journals incur ongoing costs 
associated with maintaining and archiving articles online, 
making supplementary materials and data available, offering 
search and indexing functionality, publishing related 
correspondence, technical comments and occasional 
retractions,38 and sometimes handling legal claims that may 
be made with respect to published articles.39 
 
 37. In addition to scientific papers, many journals also publish editorials, 
correspondence and short news stories of potential interest to their readership.  
Some of this content is provided by paid correspondents or freelance writers. 
 38. See Adam Mossoff, How Copyright Drives Innovation in Scholarly 
Publishing, GEORGE MASON UNIV. LAW & ECON. RES. PAPER SERIES 13-25, 17-
21 (May 2013) (describing significant costs incurred by publishers in creating 
online and other resources, managing peer review and the like); Letter from 
Alan I. Leshner, Chief Executive Officer and Executive Publisher, Science, to 
Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) (Jan. 12, 2012) (on file with 
author). 
 39. Such claims may involve allegations of defamation, scientific 
misconduct, fraud, plagiarism, copyright infringement and conflict of interest.  
While ultimate legal liability for such claims may rest with the authors and/or 
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Estimates of the costs incurred by scientific publishers 
vary.  By one estimate, publication costs for a single article in 
the most prestigious scientific journals can run up to 
$10,000.40  Others estimate that first copy costs of publishing 
an article in a scientific journal (i.e., excluding printing, 
distribution, marketing, and overhead expenses) typically run 
between $1000 and $4000.41 
2. Revenue  
The traditional journal revenue model is based on 
subscription sales to academic libraries.42  Libraries acquire 
journal subscriptions to make their content available to 
researchers within their institutions.  In the past, this meant 
that paper copies of journals would be routed to relevant 
researchers or placed in departmental lounges before being 
archived in the library’s general collection.  Today, most 
scientific journals are distributed electronically (sometimes in 
addition to print copies), and an institutional subscription 
entitles affiliated researchers to access the journal’s articles 
in electronic form. 
As discussed in the Introduction, the subscription model 
for scientific journals worked without major incident until the 
large-scale entrance of commercial publishers following World 
War II.43  Beginning in the 1960s, the number of scientific 
journals began to proliferate, so that over the last fifty years 
the number of individual journal titles has increased by 
approximately a factor of ten.44  Together with the expanding 
number of journals, subscription rates increased 
dramatically, resulting in widespread cancellation of 
 
their institutions, journals are often the first responders when such claims are 
made. 
 40. Jocelyn Kaiser, Free Journals Grow Among Ongoing Debate, 329 
SCIENCE 896, 897 (2010). 
 41. Donald W. King, The Cost of Journal Publishing: A Literature Review 
and Commentary, 20 LEARNED PUBLISHING 85, 93–95 (2007); cf. THE 
WELLCOME TRUST, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH PUBLISHING 
13 (2004), available at http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/stellent/groups/corporatesite 
/@policy_communications/documents/web_document/wtd003182.pdf.  For 
additional data, see Mosoff, supra note 38. 
 42. See, e.g., WILLINSKY, supra note 21, at 18–19; THE WELLCOME TRUST, 
supra note 41, at 15. 
 43. See, e.g., WILLINSKY, supra note 21, at 13–14. 
 44. See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text. 
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subscriptions and, as discussed above, the so-called serials 
crisis.45  According to a 1997 study conducted by Page, 
Campbell and Meadows, subscription revenue still accounts 
for approximately eighty-five percent of total revenue for 
journals in the sciences.46 
In addition to subscription revenue, scientific journals 
earn income from reprint sales (encompassing printed 
reprints, permissions for reproduction, and one-time access to 
electronic copies).47  According to one estimate, a single 
highly-cited article can generate reprint revenue of up to 
$700,000.48  However, most articles generate little or no 
reprint revenue.  Page, Campbell and Meadows report that 
combined reprint revenue accounts for approximately eight 
percent of total revenue for journals in the sciences.49 
Another potential revenue source for some journals is 
advertising.  In 2008, for example, the American Medical 
Association, publisher of the prestigious Journal of the 
American Medical Association (JAMA) reported that 
advertising generated forty-nine percent of its total 
publishing revenue.50  The percentage, however, is 
significantly lower for commercial publishers that have a 
larger overall revenue base.  Page, Campbell and Meadows 
report that five percent of journal revenue is attributable to 
advertising.51 
Both revenue and operating margins for scientific 
publishers are sizeable.  As noted above, the overall annual 
market for scientific journals is estimated to be between $7 
and $10 billion.52  A few large publishers, however, dominate 
the field.  In 2009, the two largest, Elsevier and Wolters 
Kluwer, earned annual revenues of approximately $3 billion 
and $1 billion, respectively, and each enjoyed profit margins 
 
 45. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 46. GILLIAN PAGE, ROBERT CAMPBELL & ARTHUR JACK MEADOWS, JOURNAL 
PUBLISHING 65 tbl.6.5, reprinted in THE WELLCOME TRUST, supra note 41. 
 47. E. Ray Dorsey et al., Finances of the Publishers of the Most Highly Cited 
US Medical Journals, 99 J. MED. LIBR. ASS’N 255, 257 (2011). 
 48. Id. 
 49. PAGE, CAMPBELL & MEADOWS, supra note 46, at 65 tbl.6.5. 
 50. Dorsey et al., supra note 47.  Note, however, that the AMA, as a non-
profit publisher, charges far lower subscription rates than commercial 
publishers. 
 51. PAGE, CAMPBELL & MEADOWS, supra note 46, at 65 tbl.6.5. 
 52. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. 
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in excess of thirty percent.53 
3. The Journal Pricing Debate 
The complaint that elevated subscription pricing shuts 
out too many potential consumers may at first seem 
inconsistent with basic economic theory.  Absent 
governmental regulation or violations of antitrust law, 
producers generally have no obligation to price their goods so 
that every potential consumer can afford them.  Assuming 
that scientific papers are unique works that are not easily 
substitutable,54 pricing of scientific journals would be 
expected to approach the publisher’s profit-maximizing point.  
That is, in the market for a product as to which there are few 
and/or imperfect substitutes, a producer (acting as a 
monopolist55) will increase its price up to the point above 
which further increases would result in diminished demand 
and lower overall profit.  At this point some quantity of 
consumers will purchase the product, but fewer than the 
number that would purchase it at a perfectly competitive 
price.  If the producer sets the price of its products too high, it 
will forego profits.  One could argue, therefore, that journal 
publishers have no incentive to over-charge for subscriptions, 
as this tactic would inure to their own detriment. 
One might counter, however, that just because a small 
number of wealthy institutions can afford journals’ high 
subscription rates, the market is not working efficiently.  
Instead this situation is symptomatic of a market failure that 
 
 53. Dorsey et al., supra note 47, at 256.  In contrast, the top ten non-profit 
publishers of medical journals earned total combined revenues of less than $200 
million in 2008.  Id.  The Economist reports Elsevier’s 2010 profit margin at 
thirty-six percent.  Of Goats and Headaches, THE ECONOMIST, May 26, 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/node/18744177. 
 54. Felix S. Chew, Kevin T. Llewellyn & Kathryn M. Olsen, Electronic 
Publishing in Radiology: Economics and the Future, 1 J. AM. COLL. RADIOLOGY 
815 (2004) (supporting the notion of non-substitutability of journals in 
radiology). 
 55. The scientific publishing market may more accurately be described as 
one of monopolistic competition, in which products (journals) do not serve as 
substitutes for one another, but in which producers (publishers) do exhibit some 
characteristics of market competitors.  The publishing industry is generally 
viewed as exhibiting the characteristics of monopolistic competition.  See 
generally N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 329–31 (6th 
ed. 2012). 
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reduces overall social welfare,56 namely the advancement of 
scientific progress.  Scientific literature, one would argue, is 
not a luxury good, the overall distribution and production of 
which society is indifferent to.  Rather, the broad distribution 
of scientific knowledge is itself a social good that should be 
encouraged, or at least not stymied through the pricing action 
of non-producing intermediaries such as publishers.  The loss 
of utility experienced by consumers who do not purchase a 
product at the monopolistic publisher’s profit-maximizing 
price is termed deadweight loss. 
This critique echoes the criticism of pharmaceutical 
manufacturers in the access to medicines debate.  These 
manufacturers are alleged to have charged monopolistic 
profit-maximizing prices for patented drugs in developing 
countries, where only a tiny fraction of the population can 
afford them.57  In this market, deadweight loss can be equated 
to a reduction in access to life-saving medications, and a 
corresponding social benefit can be derived from minimizing 
this deadweight loss. 
In the case of scientific publishing, deadweight loss is 
created when institutions are unable or unwilling to pay a 
journal’s subscription rates and are thus unable to give their 
faculty access to the journal’s content.  In other words, the 
deadweight loss represented by the inability of scientists to 
access scientific information results in less overall scientific 
advancement—fewer medical and technological 
breakthroughs—and is thus socially undesirable.58  The 
 
 56. Landes and Posner argue that total welfare should not be affected by 
losses to consumers from higher prices in markets dominated by copyright.  
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 81–82 (2003).  This view, however, assumes a 
regime in which the creation of copyrighted works is affected by the level of 
copyright protection.  In the case of scientific publishing, incentives for authors 
are typically independent of copyright protection.  See, e.g., Frank Mueller-
Langer & Richard Watt, Copyright and Open Access for Academic Works, 7 REV. 
ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 45, 47–48 (2010); Steven Shavell, Should 
Copyright of Academic Works be Abolished?, 2  J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 301 (2010). 
 57. See, e.g., Sean Flynn, Aidan Hollis, & Mike Palmedo, An Economic 
Justification for Open Access to Essential Medicine Patents in Developing 
Countries, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 184, 185 (2009); Jerome H. Reichman, 
Comment: Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions: 
Evaluating the Options, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS  247, 250 (2009). 
 58. Suboptimal social welfare may result not only from loss of access by 
institutions unable to afford publishers’ profit-maximizing rates, but also from 
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reported effects of the serials crisis on actual institutions, 
both within the industrialized world and, more tellingly, in 
the developing world, support the argument that overall 
scientific progress may be less than it otherwise could be 
absent the publishing industry’s current pricing structure.59 
Journals, of course, incur costs, and many critics 
acknowledge that scientific publishers contribute value to the 
publishing enterprise.  Landes and Posner remind us of this 
often-neglected element of the equation: 
[w]e must not ignore the publishers . . . . Given substantial 
fixed costs of publication and easy copiability, publishers 
may need copyright protection in order to be able to 
recover their fixed costs even if they don’t have to pay a 
cent for the expressive content of what they publish.60 
Critics counter, however, that the escalating subscription 
rates charged by journals have far outstripped mere cost 
recovery and cannot be justified on this basis alone.61  The 
reported thirty percent-plus profit margins of major 
commercial publishers, substantially in excess of margins 
elsewhere in the publishing industry,62 would seem to support 
this assertion.  Moreover, unlike pharmaceutical 
 
those that can afford these rates, as the excess rent paid by research 
institutions to publishers (whether funded internally or by government grants) 
is diverted to publishers and away from the funding of further scientific 
research.  And unlike other monopolists, such as patent-holding pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, who arguably utilize excess profits to fund further research and 
development, scientific publishers do not themselves fund any scientific 
research. 
 59. See, e.g., WILLINSKY, supra note 21, at  93–94 (describing the 
devastating loss of subscriptions by research institutions in the developing 
world); Barbara Aronson, Improving Online Access to Medical Information for 
Low-Income Countries, 350 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 9668 (2004) (reporting the 
results of a 2001 WHO study finding that fifty-six percent of all research 
institutions in the lowest-income tier countries had no subscriptions to 
international scientific journals and twenty-one percent averaged only two such 
subscriptions; and even in the next income tier, thirty-four percent had no 
subscriptions, and thirty-four percent had between two and five such 
subscriptions). 
 60. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 56, at 53. 
 61. See, e.g., McCabe & Snyder, supra note 23, at 1. 
 62. See Ernst & Young, New Study Shows Profitability and Growth in 
Media and Entertainment (Mar. 14, 2011), available at 
http://www.ey.com/US/en/Newsroom/ 
News-releases/New-study-shows-profitability-and-growth-in-media-and-
entertainment (finding average twenty percent profitability in publishing 
industry). 
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manufacturers, scientific journals do not require even a 
portion the financial incentives permitted by monopolistic 
pricing in order to fund the creation of new scientific works, 
as these works are created by scientists who are not 
financially compensated by the journals. 
C. Leveraging Copyright 
Given that both the bulk of the content that they publish 
and a significant editorial and quality-control function are 
provided to journals for free by their own customers, how 
have commercial publishers managed to escalate the prices of 
scientific journals to monopolistic levels that, by most 
accounts, are far in excess of their costs?  Reputational factors 
and the dependence of scientists on publication in prestigious 
journals give journals significant leverage to attract high-
quality articles notwithstanding their pricing policies.63  But 
once a journal attracts an article, it retains its absolute 
control over the article through copyright law. 
1. Why Copyright Matters   
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to 
secure to authors the exclusive right to their writings for 
limited times in order to “promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts.”64  Thus, according to the well-known incentive-
based copyright argument, authors must be granted some 
exclusivity in their works if they are to be persuaded to create 
them in the first place.65  As Thomas Macaulay explained in 
1841, copyright imposes “a tax on readers for the purpose of 
giving a bounty to writers.”66 
As an initial matter, however, it is not immediately 
apparent why copyright law matters at all in scientific 
 
 63. Journals’ relative impunity in this area is bolstered by the separation of 
research and library functions at most institutions. 
 64. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
 65. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 56, at 11.  But see Stan J. Leibowitz, Is 
Efficient Copyright a Reasonable Goal?, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1692 (2011) 
(arguing that economic efficiency is not a reasonable goal of copyright law). 
 66. Thomas B. Macaulay, The First Speech on Copyright, February 5, 1841, 
in MACAULAY’S SPEECHES ON COPYRIGHT AND LINCOLN’S ADDRESS AT COOPER 
UNION 18, 25 (Charles Robert Gaston ed., 1914) (quoted in Stephen G. Breyer, 
The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Look Back Across Four Decades, 79 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1635, 1641 (2011)). 
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publishing.  The law is well-settled that scientific facts, data, 
and discoveries are not themselves copyrightable.67  And, 
unlike most other works of authorship (e.g., novels, musical 
compositions, paintings, and screenplays), there is little 
creative expression in the text of scientific journal articles, 
and only marginally more in their illustrations and figures.  
The primary, if not the only, goal of such articles is to 
communicate new scientific data, findings and conclusions to 
an interested audience of fellow scientists.  The manner of 
expression, the language in which the article is written, 
provided that it is generally comprehensible to the intended 
audience, is irrelevant.68 
For example, below are two short descriptions of the 
same scientific finding.  The first is an excerpt from the 
abstract of an actual scientific article, the second is a 
rewording of that excerpt in a form that conveys the same 
information (to the best of this author’s limited ability), but 
via a different form of expression. 
Although eye color is usually modeled as a simple, 
Mendelian trait, further research and observation has 
indicated that eye color does not follow the classical paths 
of inheritance . . . . Although there are about 16 different 
genes responsible for eye color, it is mostly attributed to 
two adjacent genes on chromosome 15.69 
Despite the typical modeling of eye color heritability in 
classical Mendelian terms, our research shows that eye 
color is not determined through traditional inheritance 
 
 67. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) 
(stating that a compilation of facts may be copyrightable, but the facts 
themselves can never be the subject of copyright); Int’l News Serv. v. Associated 
Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (finding that the factual element of news is not 
copyrightable).  See generally J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually 
Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist 
Intellectual Property Environment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 315, 337–38  
(2003) (describing the thin copyright in scientific works and data). 
 68. In fact, the prose in which scientific articles are written has frequently 
been criticized for its density, turgidity and generally poor quality.  See, e.g., 
Rachel Toor, Bad Writing and Bad Thinking, CHRON. HIGHER ED. (Apr. 15, 
2010), http://chronicle.com/article/Bad-WritingBad-Thinking/65031/ (criticizing 
scholarly writing that uses “multisyllabic words, complex phrasing, and 
sentences that go on for days” and noting that “[i]f you're too clear, if your 
sentences are too simple, your peers won't take you seriously”). 
 69. Désirée White & Montserrat Rabago-Smith, Genotype-Phenotype 
Associations and Human Eye Color, 56 J. HUMAN GENETICS 5 (2011). 
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pathways. . . . We identify a pair of neighboring genes 
along chromosome 15 that are found to have primary 
responsibility for determining eye color, among the sixteen 
or so genes that are generally credited with affecting this 
trait. 
Though these two statements arguably convey the same 
scientific information (two genes out of sixteen strongly 
influence inherited eye color), the two modes in which this 
idea is expressed are sufficiently distinct that the second 
version should not infringe the copyright in the first.70  Thus, 
even if dissemination of the first statement were barred by 
the owner of the copyright (a journal), that copyright owner 
could not restrict dissemination of the second statement. 
If this is the case, then what would prevent scientific 
authors from recreating each of their copyrighted articles in a 
different guise and allowing the second versions to be 
distributed free of the control of publishers?  Legally 
speaking, this approach might be viable.  Practically 
speaking, however, such rephrasing would require a 
significant amount of work by the author—work that would 
not result in any material benefit.  There is a low likelihood 
that busy scientists, racing to obtain grant funding and 
publish their latest findings, would take the time to rewrite 
each of their articles simply to help others who could not 
afford to subscribe to certain journals.  And what about 
rewriting by graduate students, laboratory technicians, or 
even undergraduate work-study students?  While no formal 
study has been conducted, scientists whom I have informally 
queried claim that they would be unlikely to read or give 
much credence to such rewritten articles.  They would be 
concerned about reliability and the introduction of errors, 
 
 70. Infringement of the exclusive right to reproduce, absent direct evidence 
of copying, can be established when the alleged copier had access to the original 
and the alleged copy is substantially similar to the original.  Kay Berry, Inc. v. 
Taylor Gifts, Inc., 421 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2005); Fogerty v. MGM Grp. Holdings 
Corp., 379 F.3d 348, 352 (6th Cir. 2004).  The similarity comparison does not 
take into account un-copyrightable materials, such as facts.  See Feist Publ’ns, 
Inc., 499 U.S. at 348.  Once unprotected aspects are removed the substantial 
similarity analysis “asks whether an ‘ordinary observer’ would perceive the 
original and the alleged copy as substantially similar.”  Fogerty, 379 F.3d at 352 
(quoting Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 855–57 (6th Cir. 2003)).  Once the facts 
are removed from the two paragraphs, the second is not substantially similar to 
the first and does not infringe the exclusive right of copying. 
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about losing the nuances of an experienced researcher’s 
reasoning, and about the interpretive exigencies of any 
translation exercise.  Thus, even for scientific works, it 
appears that copyright cannot easily be circumvented, and 
that any solution to the serials crisis must address copyright 
head-on. 
2. Author’s Assignment of Rights   
Under modern copyright law, the author of a literary 
work has a number of exclusive rights, including the rights to 
reproduce, distribute, and display the work.71  The authors of 
scientific journal articles, which generally qualify as literary 
works, are also entitled to these exclusive rights.72  But when 
a scientific article is accepted for publication in a journal, the 
publisher typically requires that the author assign to it the 
full copyright in the article.73  This assignment of copyright 
gives the publisher complete and exclusive control over the 
reproduction, dissemination and publication of the work, even 
as to the original author and his or her institution.74  And 
while some limited rights to use the work for educational and 
research purposes may be available under the fair use 
doctrine,75 these rights cannot be exercised unless the user 
has access to a copy of the work.  Thus, one of a publisher’s 
key assets is the ability to prevent those who have not paid 
 
 71. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
 72. Under the Copyright Act, ownership of a copyrightable work vests in the 
author upon fixation of the work in a tangible medium.  Id. § 102(a).  But in the 
case of employees who create copyrighted works within the scope of their 
employment (works made for hire), their employers are treated as the authors 
and thereby obtain ownership of the copyright.  Id. § 101.  An exception to this 
rule has been recognized in the case of academic authors, most of whom are 
employed by a university or other institution, but who typically retain copyright 
in works either through contractual arrangement with their institution or via 
the so-called teacher exception to the work made for hire doctrine.  See Eric 
Priest, Copyright, Scholarship, Authorial Autonomy, and the “Harvard” Open 
Access Mandate, 10 NW. J.L. SCI. TECH. 377, 403 (2012). 
 73. See, e.g., Mueller-Langer & Watt, supra note 56, at 47. 
 74. In economic terms, copyright enables the journal publisher to act as a 
monopolist in the market for readers.  See Frank Mueller-Langer & Richard 
Watt, Optimal Pricing and Quality of Academic Journals and the Ambiguous 
Welfare Effects of Forced Open Access: A Two-Sided Model, TILEC DISCUSSION 
PAPER, DP 2012-19 at 1–2 (Apr. 25, 2012). 
 75. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
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for a work from accessing it.76 
3. Copyright Duration  
As observed by Patricia Aufderheide and Peter Jaszi, 
copyright is both long and strong.77  Despite the 
Constitutional restriction of the term of an author’s copyright 
exclusivity to limited times, the term of copyright protection 
in the United States has grown steadily over the years.  
Under the original Copyright Act of 1790, Congress set the 
maximum period of exclusivity at twenty-eight years (an 
initial term of fourteen years plus a fourteen-year renewal 
term).78  Since then, the term of copyright in the United 
States has steadily increased.79  Today, under the 1998 Sonny 
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, the copyright term for 
most works is the life of the author plus seventy years.80  The 
term of protection can thus easily exceed a century.  Because 
of this extraordinary protective period, the exclusive rights 
controlled by publishers enable them to control the market for 
scientific works for the entire useful life of those works. 
Interestingly, had the current copyright regime then 
been in effect, the works of Nicola Tesla (1856–1943) and 
George Washington Carver (1864–1943), each of whom made 
significant scientific discoveries during the nineteenth 
century, and most scientists who followed them, would still be 
protected by copyright in 2012.  What if only a handful of 
scientists at wealthy institutions had access to the corpus of 
scientific literature of the last century?  One can only 
speculate (with some dismay) about the effect that such a 
lengthy restrictive regime might have had on the progress of 
 
 76. Section 1201 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. 
105-304, prohibits any attempt to circumvent electronic protection measures to 
access a digitally protected work, even if the purpose is to exercise fair use 
rights.  For a critique of this level of legal protection in the context of scientific 
data, see Reichman & Uhlir, supra, note 67, at 376–79. 
 77. PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, RECLAIMING FAIR USE—HOW 
TO PUT BALANCE BACK IN COPYRIGHT 16 (2011). 
 78. Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124 § 1 (1790).  
 79. The extension of copyright term is not unique to the United States.  See 
Council Directive 93/98/EEC (2003) (implementing the same copyright term 
length for authors later reflected in the Sonny Bono Act in the United States).  
 80. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c).  For anonymous works, pseudonymous works and 
works made for hire, the copyright term expires ninety-five years from 
publication or 120 years from creation, whichever occurs first.  Id. 
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science. 
Notwithstanding these considerations, the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly affirmed the ability of Congress to 
extend the term of copyright protection at these levels.  Most 
notably, when the constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Act 
was challenged in Eldred v. Ashcroft,81 Justice Ginsburg, 
writing for the majority, relied on “[t]ext, history, and 
precedent” to confirm that the Copyright Clause grants 
Congress broad power to establish the term of copyright 
protection,82 and declined to “ ‘alter the delicate balance 
Congress has labored to achieve.’ ”83  Even more recently, in 
Golan v. Holder,84 Justice Ginsburg again affirmed the power 
of Congress to expand the scope of copyright protection 
without significant restraint.85 
Thus, the long horizon of copyright protection, coupled 
with the assignment of copyright by authors to publishers, 
has resulted in a situation in which publishers who neither 
create nor fund the creation of scientific works exert near-
absolute control over their distribution, and charge the 
market accordingly.  The result has been a curtailment of the 
literature available to many members of the scientific 
community, an undesirable result from a social welfare 
standpoint. 
It is my goal in this Article to propose a modified 
scientific publishing model that both compensates publishers 
fairly for the value that they add as intermediaries, while at 
the same time ensuring that the published scientific 
literature is made broadly available to the scientific 
community to enable the continuing advancement of science. 
 
 81. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 82. Id. at 187.  But see id. at 244–45 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
Congress’s extension of copyright terms should be subject to a rationality test). 
 83. Id. at 205 n.10 (majority opinion) (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 
207, 230 (1990)). 
 84. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) (challenge to Congress’ grant of 
copyright protection to works already in the public domain).   
 85. Id. at 878 (“We conclude that § 514 does not transgress constitutional 
limitations on Congress' authority.  Neither the Copyright and Patent Clause 
nor the First Amendment, we hold, makes the public domain, in any and all 
cases, a territory that works may never exit.”). 
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II. ADDRESSING THE CRISIS THROUGH COPYRIGHT REFORM 
In this Section, I address Steven Shavell’s recent 
proposal to abolish copyright in academic works as a solution 
to the crisis in scientific publishing.  I analyze this proposal 
as a tailoring solution targeting the problem of uniformity 
cost using the three-part analytical framework proposed by 
Michael Carroll. 
A. Abolishing Academic Copyright? 
If copyright law caused the serials crisis, then it stands to 
reason that substantive changes to copyright law can 
alleviate it.  Steven Shavell, perhaps the most prominent 
scholar to advocate this approach, argues that copyright in 
academic works should be abolished altogether.86  While this 
conclusion may, at first blush, sound extravagant, Shavell’s 
careful reasoning bears consideration.87 
First, Shavell suggests that “the conventional rationale 
for copyright of written works—that it stimulates their 
creation and publication by allowing authors to profit from 
their sale—is seemingly of limited applicability to academic 
 
 86. Shavell, supra note 56, at 301.  Shavell is not, of course, the first scholar 
to argue for the abolition or severe curtailment of copyright term.  Debating the 
appropriate duration of intellectual property protection has been a favorite 
pastime of academic commentators for decades.  See generally LISA A. GIDDINGS 
& STEPHEN A. SCHNEIDER, ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 5–7 (1999) (reviewing the work of economists including Arrow (1962), 
Nordhaus (1962 and 1969), Kamien and Schwartz (1974) and Scherer (1984)).  
In the area of copyright, specifically, see MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, 
AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 15 (2008) (“[t]he basic conclusion of this 
book is that intellectual monopoly—patents, copyrights, and restrictive 
licensing agreements—are unnecessary”); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF 
IDEAS 250–52 (2001) (arguing for a renewable five-year copyright term, with a 
particular focus on online content); Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for 
Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer 
Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970) (arguing that extension of copyright 
terms is unnecessary).  For a contrary view, see LANDES & POSNER, supra note 
56, at 215–16 (presenting the economic argument for copyrights of indefinite 
duration, subject to ongoing renewal requirements). 
 87. In this brief summary I cannot do justice to the economic model 
developed by Shavell, and will primarily address his qualitative reasoning and 
conclusions.  An alternative to the Shavell model is presented in a paper by 
Frank Mueller-Langer and Richard Watt.  Mueller-Langer & Watt,  supra note 
74, at 24 (concluding that removal of copyright could have different effects 
depending on market configuration). 
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authors.”88  To this end, he observes that academics possess 
strong incentives to publish scholarly work that are wholly 
independent of copyright.  As discussed above, these 
incentives include recognition, career advancement, and 
support of grant applications.  By the same token, academics 
receive little if any direct pecuniary gain from the publication 
of scholarly articles.89  Thus, the financial incentives that 
copyright protection may offer to the authors of works of 
fiction, musical compositions, and other copyrighted works do 
not necessarily apply to works of academic scholarship, and 
the abolition of copyright on academic works would likely 
have little impact on the overall production of these works or 
the financial returns to their authors. 
Next, Shavell considers the potential impact of abolishing 
academic copyright on publishers.  He acknowledges that 
publishers incur costs associated with their services as 
intermediaries.90  He also postulates that absent copyright, 
there would be no effective means for them to prevent others 
from copying and distributing published works soon after 
their initial appearance.91  In the face of rapid, inexpensive, 
and legal copying, it would become impossible for journals to 
charge readers for their content (i.e., driving subscription and 
reprint rates to marginal cost, effectively zero).  Publishers 
would thus need to look elsewhere to recoup their costs.92  
Absent subscription revenues, publishers would most likely 
turn to authors.  In such an author-pays model, the author’s 
institution (either itself or through grant funding) might or 
might not cover publication costs.  Shavell acknowledges that 
if an author’s institution did not cover publication costs, then 
 
 88. Shavell, supra note 56, at 301–02 (footnote omitted).  For a statement of 
the traditional incentive-based argument for copyright, see LANDES & POSNER, 
supra note 56, at 13 (“[t]he dynamic benefit of a property right is the incentive 
that possession of such a right imparts to invest in the creation or improvement 
of a resource . . . . It enables people to reap where they have sown.”). 
 89. Shavell’s proposal deals both with academic journal articles and books.  
Given the focus of my analysis on the serials crisis and means that have been 
proposed to alleviate its effects, I do not address his analysis of scholarly books 
in detail. 
 90. Shavell, supra note 56, at 302–03, 306. 
 91. Id. at 317, 328. 
 92. In a world without copyright, Shavell envisions most publication 
occurring electronically, without printing and distribution costs.  He thus 
focuses exclusively on publisher first copy costs.  Id. at 317. 
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the abolition of copyright might have a negative impact on 
the production of scholarly work (as authors would probably 
be reluctant to pay journal fees out of their personal funds).93  
However, Shavell argues that institutions and funders would 
have numerous reasons to cover these costs (e.g., to ensure 
that the work conducted by researchers they support 
continues to be published), and would likely have the means 
to do so.94  In such a world, authors would not be financially 
disadvantaged by the abolition of copyright, resulting in no 
net increase or decrease in the number of scholarly works 
produced; publishers would recover their costs and thus 
continue to perform as value-added intermediaries; and the 
free availability of such works to the public would yield a 
significant social benefit.95  Thus, Shavell concludes that the 
abolition of copyright in academic works should be seriously 
considered as a possible solution to the serials crisis.96 
B. The Challenge of Tailoring Copyright Term 
Shavell’s proposal to abolish copyright on academic works 
would adjust the intellectual property rights awarded by 
Congress to authors based on the peculiar incentive 
structures of the scientific publishing industry.  Michael 
Carroll refers to this type of industry-specific calibration as 
tailoring,97 and observes that tailoring can reduce 
inefficiencies created by one-size-fits-all intellectual property 
regimes.  That is, under the current copyright system, once a 
work is determined to be copyrightable subject matter, the 
term of protection is uniform, no matter what the nature of 
the work or its author.  This blunt approach overcompensates 
creators in industries in which the incentives to produce new 
works do not require the level of protection afforded by the 
law.  This overcompensation comes at the expense of the 
public, which has limited rights to exploit the work during 
the term of protection, resulting in a net social cost without 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. In this vein, he argues that universities would be more than capable of 
funding such author fees from the savings they realize by no longer having to 
pay subscription fees for academic journals.  Id. at 232. 
 95. Id. at 328–30. 
 96. Id. at 330. 
 97. See Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework For 
Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361 (2009). 
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an offsetting gain in the production of new works.  This cost, 
which results from the application of a uniform exclusive 
term to all forms of copyrighted works, has been termed 
uniformity cost.98  According to Carroll, “uniformity cost is the 
central problem that intellectual property law must 
manage.”99  Robert Merges has framed the problem of 
uniformity cost in terms of proportionality, reasoning “that a 
property right ought to be reasonably related to something 
socially useful and valuable.  Where the unregulated market 
price of a property right moves radically out of alignment 
with underlying social utility, an institutional response is 
called for.”100 
Proposals to tailor the scope and term of intellectual 
property rights based on the characteristics and requirements 
of particular industries have long been attractive to scholars 
and advocates.  As long ago as 1884, Congressional backers of 
the newspaper industry sought (unsuccessfully) to enact an 
eight-hour copyright on the news.101  More recently, Dan Burk 
and Mark Lemley have pointed to significant differences in 
the cost and incentive structures of the pharmaceutical 
industry, on one hand, and the information technology 
industry, on the other hand.102  These differences, they argue, 
cannot be accounted for under the uniform twenty-year 
patent term afforded under U.S. law, giving rise to significant 
market inefficiencies and net social cost.103 
 
 
 98. See Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in 
Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 847 (2006). 
 99. Id. at 849. 
 100. ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 181 (2011). 
 101. News Copyright Bill of 1884.  This legislative attempt was defeated.  
Thirty-two years later, the Supreme Court held that news facts are not subject 
to copyright protection, though the expression of the news in written stories 
might be, concurrently creating the so-called hot news doctrine based on state 
law tort of misappropriation.  Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 
(1918). 
 102. See generally DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND 
HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009). 
 103. Specifically, Burk and Lemley argue that while a twenty-year patent 
term might be appropriate to incentivize innovation in the pharmaceutical 
industry, with its lengthy, capital-intensive product development cycles and 
multi-year regulatory approval process, it is almost certainly not appropriate in 
the software industry, in which development cycles are a few months and 
involve few capital expenditures.  See id. at 77–92. 
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In general, applying a uniform set of intellectual property 
rules to different industries and technologies is inefficient, 
and tailoring of these rights presents a way to reduce this 
inefficiency.104  However, as Carroll points out, “tailoring 
intellectual property rights well is not easily done.”105  In 
order to aid policymakers in assessing the feasibility of 
increasing social welfare through tailoring of intellectual 
property rights, Carroll offers a useful analytical 
framework.106  In this framework, he posits three conditions 
that must be satisfied if efficiency gains are to be achieved by 
tailoring: (1) there must be reliable evidence that uniformity 
costs exist and that they can be reduced by tailoring (I term 
this the likely effectiveness of the tailoring proposal), (2) the 
measures proposed to eliminate these uniformity costs must 
be administratively feasible, and (3) the tailoring proposal 
must be politically feasible.107 
Shavell’s tailoring proposal would abolish copyright in 
academic works through an amendment to the Copyright Act.  
It is worth assessing this proposal in terms of Carroll’s three-
part framework.108 
1. Effectiveness   
Shavell’s arguments regarding the mismatch between 
copyright protection and incentives to create works of 
academic scholarship are consistent with a large body of 
previous criticism of the academic publishing market.  Thus, I 
will assume arguendo that uniformity costs exist in this 
market and that the tailoring of intellectual property rights 
can lead to greater efficiencies and social welfare. 
It is less clear, however, that Shavell’s specific proposal 
to abolish copyright on academic works would achieve optimal 
 
 104. See Carroll, supra note 98, at 848 (“[P]erfectly tailored rights that 
promise innovators only the expected value required to induce socially desirable 
innovation would be theoretically optimal.”). 
 105. Carroll, supra note 97, at 1366. 
 106. Id. at 1406–07. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Shavell’s economic model and assumptions have also been critiqued.  
See, e.g., Mueller-Langer & Watt, supra note 74; Hossein Nabilou, A Response to 
Prof. Shavell’s ‘Should Copyright of Academic Works Be Abolished?,’ 7 REV. 
ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 31 (2010).  An analysis of the Shavell formal 
model and its critiques is beyond the scope of this Article. 
3_CONTRERAS FINAL.DOC 7/23/2013  9:25 PM 
2013] THE CRISIS IN SCIENTIFIC PUBLISHING 519 
 
results.  If copyright in academic works were abolished then, 
as discussed above, commercial publishers would likely turn 
to authors to cover their costs.  The economics of an author-
pays world are not well understood.  Today, a number of open 
access scientific journals have adopted author-pays models,109 
but these are still a small fraction of the overall market.  If 
the entire scientific publishing industry moved from a 
subscriber-pays to an author-pays model, there is a risk that 
the current reader-side serials crisis would simply be 
transformed into an author-side serials crisis.  That is, once 
all publishers are operating under an author-pays model, 
what would prevent the subsequent escalation of author fees 
on a scale mirroring the escalation of subscriber fees today?  
In other words, if competition has not mediated price 
escalation on the subscriber side (due to the general 
inelasticity of journal prices) and publishers have been able to 
extract super-competitive rents from subscribers, it is 
possible that the same market forces would allow a similar 
escalation of author fees, particularly among the most 
prestigious and desirable (from an author’s standpoint) 
publications. 
Moreover, it is not clear that authors or their institutions 
would be willing or able to pay author-side fees once they are 
required by all journals (as opposed to the small percentage of 
journals levying such fees today).  If not, then authors (as 
opposed to readers) could become priced out of the academic 
scholarship market or some number of journals could fail.110  
In either scenario, the dissemination of scholarly work could 
decrease, leading to a decrease in available scientific 
knowledge that could rival the decrease caused by the serials 
crisis on the reader side.  Thus, until further empirical and 
modeling work is done to assess the potential market effects 
of such a radical economic shift, it would be difficult to 
conclude that the abolition of copyright in academic works 
would be effective in increasing social welfare. 
 
 109. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 110. Cf. MARY WALTHAM, THE FUTURE OF SCHOLARLY JOURNALS 
PUBLISHING AMONG SOCIAL SCIENCE AND HUMANITIES ASSOCIATIONS 19 (2009), 
available at http://www.nhalliance.org/bm~doc/hssreport.pdf (noting that of ten 
social sciences and humanities journals studied, most could not move to an 
author-pays model with their current cost structures). 
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2. Administrability  
Carroll’s second test queries whether “the distinctions 
drawn [by a tailoring solution] are jurisprudentially stable 
and administratively cost-effective.”111  An example of a rule 
that is relatively easy to administer is section 105 of the 
Copyright Act, which denies copyright protection to works 
created by U.S. government employees.112  To apply this 
exclusion one must simply determine whether or not the 
author of a particular work is an “officer or employee of the 
U.S. Government” and whether the work was prepared 
within the scope of that person’s governmental duties.113  To 
the extent that questions have been raised around its edges 
(e.g., whether government contractors should be considered 
government employees), they can be answered definitively by 
the courts. 
The distinction proposed by Shavell between academic 
and non-academic works, however, is less clearly delineated.  
His proposal would exclude from copyright academic works, 
encompassing both books and articles in all academic 
disciplines.114  Yet many authors of articles in scientific 
journals are not full-time faculty at academic institutions, but 
employees of corporations, government agencies,115 and not-
for-profit institutions such as hospitals, think tanks, advocacy 
groups and the like.  This is especially true in fields such as 
pharmaceutical development, engineering, computer science, 
and economics.  It is not clear how Shavell would deal with 
scientific articles published by non-academic authors, not to 
 
 111. Carroll, supra note 97, at 1424; see also John Golden, Principles for 
Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 563 (2010) (defining administrability as 
establishing a regime “that government actors can readily apply and that 
interested private actors can readily heed, use, and understand”). 
 112. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2006). 
 113. Id. § 101.  
 114. Though it is a less critical point, it is also worth noting that all academic 
literature, including presumably, literature in the humanities, arts, natural 
sciences, social sciences, and professional training, has not been substantially 
affected by the serials crisis.  In this sense, the scope of Shavell’s approach is 
somewhat over-broad.  For example, literary magazines and many specialized 
journals in the humanities in which academic authors publish are priced quite 
modestly and are not generally thought to suffer from the inflationary 
tendencies of scientific journals. 
 115. The exemption for copyright protection in the work product of U.S. 
federal employees does not apply to state and local government employees or 
employees of foreign governments.  See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2006). 
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mention part-time academic authors such as adjunct 
professors, instructors, lecturers and postdoctoral fellows, or 
full-time members of the academic community who are not 
normally considered to be academic faculty: graduate 
students, project managers, and technicians.  Is Shavell’s 
proposal to abolish copyright dependent on the employer of 
the author, the nature of the author’s engagement with an 
academic institution, or the type of work being published?  If 
the former, then significant inconsistencies would arise in the 
many scientific journals that carry articles by both academics 
and non-academics (i.e., some articles would be copyrighted, 
others not).  If the latter, it is not clear that the arguments 
regarding the rationale for abolishing copyright for academics 
apply equally persuasively to non-academic authors.  
Moreover, it is difficult to conceptualize a justifiable subject 
matter-based exclusion from copyright that would accomplish 
the goal of alleviating the serials crisis without being stated 
so broadly that it would also eliminate copyright on 
textbooks, technical manuals, industry standards, and other 
technical works that may be more deserving of copyright 
protection.  Thus, it is not clear that Shavell’s proposal offers 
a solid basis for differentiating between protected and 
unprotected content that “the law can adequately 
delineate,”116 and thus suffers from likely difficulties in 
administrability. 
3. Political Economy 
The third prong of Carroll’s tailoring framework requires 
an assessment of the political economy of a tailoring 
proposal.117  As any alteration to the scope of copyright 
protection is likely to require an amendment to the Copyright 
Act, Shavell proposes Congressional action to address the 
uniformity cost of academic publishing.118  The Copyright Act 
has, of course, been amended many times, and many of these 
amendments have been made with the purpose of tailoring 
protection for one specific industry or another.119  Such 
 
 116. Carroll, supra note 97, at 1425. 
 117. Id. at 1406–07. 
 118. Shavell, supra note 56, at 339. 
 119. The Patent Act has been subject to similar industry-specific tailoring 
initiatives.  See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 102, at 95–96. 
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legislative initiatives include protections for the cable and 
satellite television industries (sections 111 and 119), the 
digital music industry (section 114), and visual artists 
(section 1064).120 
However, unlike most previous amendments to the 
Copyright Act, Shavell’s proposal would act to reduce the 
term of copyright protection rather than increase it.  He 
reasons that “[e]liminating academic copyright seems feasible 
from a political perspective because of its likely endorsement 
by universities, academics, and students.”121  While it is 
indeed conceivable that a coalition of universities, academics 
and students might support the abolition of academic 
copyright (except, possibly, in the case of university press 
publications), the effectiveness of such coalitions has been 
limited in cases involving copyright term length.  For 
example, in Eldred v. Ashcroft, the petitioners (Eldred, et al.) 
were joined by amici curiae including fifteen library 
associations, five arts-based academic associations, seventeen 
economists, five constitutional law professors, fifty-three 
intellectual property law professors, and numerous other 
groups.  This broad-based coalition was unsuccessful in 
persuading the Court and, evidently, in influencing Congress 
with respect to the enactment of the Sonny Bono Copyright 
Term Extension Act the year before (which passed in the 
House by a comfortable margin and the Senate by unanimous 
consent).122 
While Shavell acknowledges that political opposition to 
his proposal would likely be raised by commercial publishers, 
he only mentions in passing potential opposition from other 
parties that “would view the abolition of academic copyright 
as undesirable because it might lead to erosion of intellectual 
property rights in a wider domain.”123  Based on the 
enactment within the last decade and a half of the strongly 
pro-copyright Sonny Bono Act, Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (DMCA),124 and Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
 
 120. 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 119, 114, 106(4) (2006). 
 121. Shavell, supra note 56, at 340. 
 122. See 144 CONG. REC. H24339 (1998). 
 123. Shavell, supra note 56, at 341. 
 124. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105–304, 112 Stat. 2860 
(1998).  
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(ACTA),125 it would appear that the pro-copyright lobby in the 
United States is both formidable and effective.126  Thus, there 
is some doubt regarding the likelihood that Congress could be 
persuaded to abolish copyright in academic works in the 
current political environment.127 
There are additional political impediments to the 
legislative amendment that Shavell proposes.  He only 
mentions in passing that the abolition of academic copyright 
could conflict with U.S. treaty obligations.128  The so-called 
TRIPS Agreement129 establishes minimum requirements for 
intellectual property protection among WTO member states.  
With respect to copyright, the TRIPS Agreement requires 
members to abide by Articles 1–21 of the Berne Convention 
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1971),130 
another treaty to which the United States is a party.  Article 
2(1) of the Berne Convention expressly includes within the 
scope of copyright “every production in the literary, scientific 
and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its 
expression, such as books, pamphlets and other writings, 
lectures, addresses, sermons and other works of the same 
nature.”131  While certain exceptions from the scope of 
protection are permitted under the TRIPS Agreement, these 
may only be imposed in “special cases.”132  And Article 9 of the 
TRIPS Agreement requires that parties adopt the Berne 
 
 125. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (Oct. 1, 2011), available at http:// 
www.ustr.gov/acta. 
 126. The recent popular opposition to the pending copyright bills SOPA and 
PIPA was fueled primarily by the technology sector, an increasingly powerful 
foil to the pro-copyright content industries.  Unfortunately, it is hard to envision 
technology vendors expending significant political capital supporting the 
abolition of academic copyright. 
 127. This is not to say, however, that no legislative action in the area of 
scientific publishing is possible.  See infra Part IV discussing the NIH OA Policy 
and related legislation. 
 128. Shavell, supra note 56, at 339 n.82. 
 129. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
Annex 1C, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, available at http:// 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm3_e.htm#1 [hereinafter TRIPS 
Agreement]. 
 130. Id. at art. 9. 
 131. Berne Convention for the Protection for Literary and Artistic Works art. 
2, § 1, Sept. 9, 1886, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/ 
trtdocs_wo001.html (enacted in the United States in 1989). 
 132. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 129, at art. 13.  
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Convention’s minimum copyright term for protected works, 
the life of the author plus fifty years.133  Thus, it is likely that 
one could raise a serious challenge to the abolition of 
copyright for academic works on the basis of the United 
States’ obligations under both the TRIPS Agreement and the 
Berne Convention.134 
Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, in June 2003, 
Representative Martin Sabo (D-Minn) introduced a bill to the 
House that would have had an effect similar to Shavell’s 
proposal, though only with respect to federally-funded 
research.  Representative Sabo’s Public Access to Science Act 
(H.R. 2613) would have amended section 105 of the Copyright 
Act to provide that “Copyright protection . . . is not available 
for any work produced pursuant to scientific research 
substantially funded by the Federal Government.”135  The bill, 
which had three co-sponsors, was referred to the House 
Judiciary Committee but failed to exit committee.136 
Lemley and Burk, recognizing the difficulty of enacting 
effective legislative changes, suggest that tailoring of 
intellectual property rights (specifically patents) may best be 
achieved through judicial action.137  While Carroll is less 
pessimistic about the potential for legislative tailoring 
solutions, he too acknowledges that achieving lasting 
efficiency gains through legislative enactments is 
challenging.138  In the case of abolishing copyright for 
academic works, the legislative hurdles seem particularly 
high. 
Based on the foregoing, under all three prongs of 
Carroll’s framework for analyzing the tailoring of intellectual 
 
 133. Id. at art. 9; Berne Convention, supra note 131, at art. 7, § 1.  
 134. Burk and Lemley acknowledge this potential barrier to legislative 
tailoring in the context of patents.  BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 102, at 97. 
 135. Public Access to Science Act, H.R. 2613, 108th Cong. § 3(b)(1) (June 26, 
2003). 
 136. While the Public Access to Science Bill was ultimately unsuccessful, it 
was succeeded in 2004 by the Congressional directive responsible for the NIH 
OA Policy discussed in Part IV below.  That legislation, unlike the Public Access 
to Science Bill, did not abolish copyright in federally-funded scientific works, 
but encouraged (and later required) their release on an open access basis 
following the expiration of an exclusivity period negotiated by publishers.  See 
infra Part IV.A. 
 137. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 102, at 104–06. 
 138. Carroll, supra note 97, at 1432. 
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property rights, Shavell’s proposal to abolish copyright in 
academic works appears to face significant practical, 
administrative, and political challenges. 
III. RESPONSES IN THE SHADOW OF COPYRIGHT: THE OPEN 
ACCESS MOVEMENT 
Whatever the theoretical merits of abolishing academic 
copyright may be, no such proposals have yet gained serious 
traction among lawmakers or other major stakeholder groups.  
In contrast, as discussed in this Section, the open access 
(OA)139 movement among academic scholars and librarians 
has had a significant and growing impact on the public 
availability of scientific literature. 
A. The Rise of Open Access 
The emergence of the open access movement in scientific 
publishing is often linked to the rise of the Internet in the 
early- to mid-1990s, when it became increasingly clear that 
research publications could be shared online with minimal 
cost and great speed.  In 2000, Harold Varmus, the Nobel 
Prize winning Director of the U.S. National Cancer Institute, 
and other prominent scientists formed the Public Library of 
Science (PLoS), a coalition dedicated to improving public 
access to biomedical literature.140  They circulated an open 
letter, which was eventually signed by 34,000 scientists in 
180 countries, urging publishers to make “the full contents of 
the published record of research and scholarly discourse in 
medicine and the life sciences” available to the public within 
six months after initial publication.141  The OA movement 
continued to gain momentum in 2001, when a group 
 
 139. The term open access generally connotes a system in which content 
(typically scientific literature) is made freely available to readers.  A set of 
formal characteristics of open access publishing were developed at a 2003 
meeting held at Howard Hughes Medical Institute in Bethesda, Maryland.  See 
Bethesda Statement on Open Access Publishing (June 20, 2003), 
http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/fos/bethesda.htm.  Since then, numerous 
publishing models have emerged under the broad rubric of  open access.  See 
generally WILLINSKY, supra note 21, at app. A (describing ten flavors of open 
access). 
 140. Early History, PLOS, http://www.plos.org/about/what-is-plos/early-
history/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2013). 
 141. Id. (containing the text of the PLoS 2001 letter). 
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sponsored by George Soros’s Open Society Institute met in 
Budapest to develop a set of recommendations for expanding 
open access to peer-reviewed scientific literature.  The 
resulting Budapest Initiative (released in February 2002) 
calls both for self-archiving of journal articles by academic 
scholars and a new generation of open access journals that 
would be disseminated as widely as possible.142  Similar 
statements followed from Bethesda, Maryland (June 2003)143 
and Berlin (Oct. 2003).144  These calls for open access have 
given rise to a number of distinct OA approaches over the 
past decade.  Below is a brief summary of the principal modes 
of open access publication for scientific literature. 
B. Modes of Open Access Publication 
1. Self-Archiving—The Green Route 
 Many academic researchers post copies of their work on 
departmental or institutional web pages, making them 
available to all without charge.  This practice has been 
termed self-archiving or the Green route to open access.  One 
recent study found that in 2008, approximately twelve 
percent of the published scientific literature was available 
through Green open access archives.145  While this figure 
demonstrates that impressive gains have been made over the 
past decade, self-archived literature is still a relatively small 
percentage of the overall body of scientific literature. 
Though self-archiving enjoys the twin virtues of 
convenience and speed, it is not without its limitations.  Most 
notably, it depends heavily on the technical capabilities and 
 
 142. See Read the Budapest Open Access Initiative, BUDAPEST OPEN ACCESS 
INITIATIVE,  http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/openaccess/read (last visited 
May 3, 2013). 
 143. Bethesda Statement on Open Access Publishing, supra note 139 
(offering concrete steps that scientists, publishers, libraries and funding 
agencies can take to “promote the rapid and efficient transition to open access 
publishing”).   
 144. Berlin Declaration on Open Access to Knowledge in the Sciences 
and Humanities, Oct. 22, 2003, available at http://oa.mpg.de/berlin-
prozess/berliner-erklarung/ (offering several conditions and definitions further 
elaborating the path toward establishment of an open access regime in scientific 
publishing).  
 145. Bo-Christer Björk et al., Open Access to the Scientific Journal Literature: 
Situation 2009, 5 PLoS ONE 6 (2010). 
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idiosyncrasies of the author’s home institution, lacks indexing 
across different institutional repositories, and becomes 
unstable when authors move from one institution to another.  
To address these issues, some disciplines have moved toward 
centralized archiving services such as arXiv.org (physics and 
mathematics) and SSRN (social sciences, economics and law).  
These services generally allow free submission of articles, 
some limited indexing, and free access to all users.  They are 
typically supported by volunteer efforts, institutional grants 
and/or charitable contributions.  In addition, numerous 
software tools now exist to enable self-archiving and meta-
tagging of documents so that they can be easily searched and 
indexed.146 
From a copyright standpoint, before an author enters into 
a publishing contract with a journal, he or she is free to self-
archive drafts and working papers as he or she wishes.  But 
once an article is accepted by a journal and the author 
assigns the copyright to the publisher, the publisher obtains 
the exclusive right to control distribution of that work.  Thus, 
the author who wishes to post a copy of a published article on 
his or her institutional web site cannot do so without the 
permission of the publisher. 
In response to this situation, a number of prominent 
research universities, in conjunction with groups such as the 
Association of College and Research Libraries (ACRL) and the 
Scholarly Publishing and Academic Resources Coalition 
(SPARC), began in 2005 to encourage researchers to utilize 
so-called author addenda in their publishing contracts.147  
Among other things, author addenda reserve the author’s 
right to self-archive pre-publication versions of articles 
following journal publication.148  Large institutions that 
subscribe to numerous research publications have proven to 
possess sufficient bargaining leverage to persuade publishers 
to permit such archiving by their faculty, often after the 
 
 146. WILLINSKY, supra note 21, at app. F. 
 147. See SPARC, Author Rights: Using the SPARC Author Addendum to 
Secure Your Rights as the Author of a Journal Article (2006), available at 
http://www.arl.org/sparc/author/addendum.shtml. 
 148. Archived pre-publication versions of articles are typically either pre-
print (articles that have not yet been accepted by a journal) or post-print (the 
final manuscript after peer review and acceptance for publication, but prior to 
the publisher’s copy editing, design, formatting and other services). 
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expiration of an embargo period of six to twelve months, and 
self-archiving of pre-print versions of articles after the 
expiration of an agreed embargo period is now permitted by a 
growing number of commercial publishers.149  But, as several 
commentators have pointed out, a pre-print version of an 
article cannot substitute for the final published article, as it 
cannot be cited or quoted authoritatively, nor would it always 
reflect the refinements and corrections introduced by a 
journal’s peer reviewers.150 
Green OA offers a convenient and inexpensive way to 
disseminate research literature to a large audience.  
However, it is unlikely that self-archiving can ever replace 
the selection, editing, and reputational functions provided by 
third party journals. 
2. Open Access Journals—The Gold Route   
Self-archiving is, among other things, designed to 
mitigate the copyright-based access limitations imposed by 
proprietary journals.  An alternative OA approach seeks to 
bypass limited-access journals altogether and make published 
literature open from the outset.151  This approach is enabled 
by a relatively new category of OA journals that support 
themselves not by charging subscription or access fees to 
 
 149. The RoMEO database hosted by University of Nottingham currently 
lists 217 publishers that automatically allow institutional self-archiving of 
articles and fifty-eight more that allow self-archiving after the expiration of an 
embargo period.  Publishers Allowing the Deposition of their Published 
Version/PDF in Institutional Repositories, SHERPA/ROMEO, http:// 
www.sherpa.ac.uk/romeo/PDFandIR.php?la=en (last updated Apr. 22, 2013). 
 150. See, e.g., Michael Jubb, Correspondence—Open Access: Let’s Go for Gold, 
487 NATURE 302 (2012); Shavell, supra note 56, at 332.  The same observation 
applies to conference presentations, posters and abstracts.  While valuable 
scientific information is undoubtedly disseminated through these channels, 
often long before results appear in a published article, only the definitive, 
published article is typically cited in another scientific article or grant 
application. 
 151. In the strictest sense of open access, journals should permit free online 
access to content without any restrictions on reuse (provided that users cite the 
original author and publisher on copies and derivatives of the content).  Michael 
Carroll has recently noted that “some publications have begun offering an open-
access option that charges for Internet publication without granting readers full 
reuse rights.”  Michael W. Carroll, Why Full Open Access Matters, 9 PLOS 
BIOLOGY 1 (2011).  Carroll argues that this pseudo open access approach 
violates both the spirit and the purpose of open access publication and fails to 
produce the benefits that full open access can provide. 
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readers, but by charging the authors who publish in them.  
This model has become known as the author-pays or Gold 
route to open access.152  For-profit publisher BioMed Central 
introduced the first significant Gold OA publishing venue in 
2000.  Today, BioMed Central is part of the Springer 
publishing group and publishes more than 220 OA journals in 
all fields of biomedical science.153  In 2003, the Public Library 
of Science (PLoS) launched its first open access journal, PLoS 
Biology, with financial backing from the Gordon and Betty 
Moore Foundation.154  Since then, PLoS has achieved 
significant recognition and its flagship journal, PLoS ONE, 
published 6749 papers in 2010, more than any other scientific 
journal.155 
Author publication fees for Gold OA journals generally 
range from $1000 to $5000 per article, but can reach $10,000 
or more in some cases.156  While the researcher’s institution is 
generally responsible for the payment of these fees, an 
increasing number of funding agencies and foundations have 
 
 152. Some advocates of Gold OA argue that only a minority of open access 
journals charge author fees.  See, e.g., Peter Suber, Open Access Overview, 
http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/fos/overview.htm (last updated Apr. 2, 2013) 
(reporting that seventy percent of Gold OA journals charge no author-side fees).  
Presumably, many of the non-charging Gold OA journals either receive funding 
from institutional or governmental sources or rely exclusively on volunteer 
efforts.  Such approaches are not likely both to produce high-quality work and 
remain viable over the long term.  Thus, for purposes of this Article, I follow the 
custom of equating Gold OA approaches with the author-pays model.  See 
McCabe & Snyder, supra note 23.  
     By the same token, many professional societies (such as the American 
Physiological Society) charge authors publication fees in order to defray member 
subscription costs.  See Dale J. Benos, L. Gabriel Navar & Margaret Reich, 
Publishing in the Journals of the APS: Why are Authors Charged Fees?, 278 AM. 
J. PHYSIOLOGY GASTROINTESTINAL LIVER PHYSIOLOGY 663, 663 (2000) (“Like 
many other association publishers, APS is able to keep subscription prices low 
by sharing some of the cost of publishing the journals with the authors who 
submit manuscripts. . . . Many commercial publishers do not charge authors for 
publication (i.e., page charges) but have much higher subscription prices.”); see 
also Information for Authors—Submission Guidelines, PROCEEDINGS NAT’L 
ACAD. OF SCIS., http://www.pnas.org/site/authors/fees.xhtml (last visited May 3, 
2013) (detailing fees per page and per color figure); Instructions to Authors, J. 
VIROLOGY, http://jvi.asm.org/misc/journal-ita_pub.dtl (last updated Apr. 2013) 
(detailing fees per page and per color figure). 
 153. See Journals A–Z, BIOMED CENTRAL: THE OPEN ACCESS PUBLISHER, 
http://www.biomedcentral.com/ (last visited May 3, 2013). 
 154. Early History, supra note 140. 
 155. John Whitfield, Open Access Comes of Age, 474 NATURE 428 (2011). 
 156. Maria Leptin, Open Access—Pass the Buck, 335 SCIENCE 1279 (2012). 
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indicated a willingness to pay author publication fees for 
research that they fund.157  In addition, such fees are often 
waived or heavily discounted for researchers in developing 
countries.158 
The growth of Gold OA journals over the past decade has 
been steady and is showing signs of achieving financial 
sustainability.  One study found that in 2009 nearly 200,000 
peer-reviewed articles were published in 4769 Gold OA 
journals, representing between six and eight percent of the 
total peer-reviewed scientific literature published that year.159  
Thus, while Gold OA journals have seen impressive gains in 
just a decade, the large majority of peer-reviewed scientific 
output continues to be published in commercial, limited-
access journals; and some critics question whether Gold OA 
journals will ever achieve a significant market share.160  
Among the challenges such journals face are their current 
lack of prestige as compared to many traditional journals, 
which dissuades scientists from submitting their best work to 
them.161  Moreover, until such time as a large segment of the 
 
 157. Declan Butler, US Seeks to Make Science Free for All, 464 NATURE 822, 
823 (2010).  A group of major research universities including Harvard, M.I.T., 
Dartmouth, Cornell, Berkeley, Columbia, Memorial Sloan-Kettering and the 
University of Ottawa have formed a group called the Compact for Open-Access 
Publishing Equity to advocate for greater payment of open access publication 
fees by research funders.  Compact for Open-Access Publishing Equity, 
http://www.oacompact.org/compact/ (last visited May 3, 2013). 
 158. See generally Jorge L. Contreras, Open Access Scientific Publishing and 
the Developing World, 8 ST. ANTONY’S INT’L REV. 43, 53–55 (2012) (discussing 
information philanthropy in the developing world). 
 159. Mikael Laaski et al., The Development of Open Access Journal 
Publishing from 1993 to 2009, 6 PLoS ONE 1 (2011).  Significantly higher 
figures for OA journals are reflected in the online Directory of Open Access 
Journals, which, as of this writing, lists more than 7300 OA journals in 117 
countries.  Directory of Open Access Journals, www.doaj.org (last visited May 3, 
2013).  However, these figures rely on self-reporting, do not account for 
discontinued or merged journals, and do not required that journals be peer 
reviewed in order to be included.  Shavell places the percentage of Gold OA 
journals in 2009 at four percent.  Shavell, supra note 86, at 333. 
 160. See Shavell, supra note 56, at 333–35. 
 161. Shavell views this lack of prestige as the most serious challenge faced by 
OA journals, though he also expects that the quality gap between traditional 
and OA journals may diminish over time.  Shavell, supra note 56, at 334.  This 
issue is exacerbated for OA journals as a result of the growing number of 
predatory and counterfeit journals that have emerged to lure unsuspecting 
authors to publish and then demand previously undisclosed publication fees. 
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market consists of author-pays journals,162 Gold OA journals 
will compete for authors and content with traditional journals 
that charge authors nothing.  The marketplace is further 
complicated by the emergence of questionable operators who 
appear to create new low-quality journals solely to attract 
author fees and provide few of the benefits of legitimate Gold 
OA journals.163  Thus, in the marketplace for new articles, 
Gold OA journals will continue to suffer a competitive 
disadvantage to traditional, established reader-pays journals.  
This situation will continue to be the case even if funders 
permit grant funding to be used to defray author-side 
publication fees, as some level of effort will always be 
required on the author’s part to secure this funding, and in an 
era of declining grant funding, a few thousand dollars per 
article in publication fees can always find other productive 
uses.164  Finally, it is still unclear whether an author-pays 
Gold OA model is financially viable across a large field of 
competitors.  Many of the major Gold OA initiatives operating 
today have received substantial supplemental funding from 
charitable sources165 or are part of larger profit-making 
organizations (e.g., BioMed Central, the OA arm of Springer).  
Such non-recurring revenue and support, while helpful to the 
initial entrants to the Gold OA marketplace, may not be 
available to subsequent entrants, raising questions regarding 
the scalability of the model.166 
 
 162. This is the situation that Shavell would bring about with the abolition of 
academic copyright. 
 163. See Declan Butler, The Dark Side of Publishing, 495 NATURE 433 
(2013); Jeffrey Beall, Predatory Publishers are Corrupting Open Access, 489 
NATURE 179 (2012); Martin Enserink, As Open Access Explodes, How to Tell the 
Good From the Bad and the Ugly?, 338 SCIENCE 1018 (2012). 
 164. Moreover, it is often the case that only a project’s principal investigator 
has access to grant funding for publication fees, and not post-doctoral fellows or 
graduate students and publication often occurs months or years after the 
expiration of the grant funding.  (I am grateful to Monte Buschbaum for these 
insights). 
 165. For example, in 2004 PLoS reported that ninety percent of its revenue 
derived from contributions and grants.  By 2009, eighty-nine percent of its 
revenue was earned from author fees.  Dorsey et al., supra note 47, at 257. 
 166. One recent analysis conducted by the U.K. government found that 
depending on starting assumptions about author fee levels and international 
uptake of Gold OA journals, a transition of U.K. research publications to a fully 
Gold-OA model could cost the U.K. higher education sector anything from zero 
to £70 million per year.  Editorial—Openness Costs, 486 NATURE 439 (2012) 
(citing WORKING GROUP ON EXPANDING ACCESS TO PUBLISHED RESEARCH 
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3. Voluntary Time-Delayed Open Access 
Scientific publishers have not uniformly opposed open 
access initiatives, and a few have even embraced them.  
Learned societies still publish a number of important 
scientific journals, and these have been among the most 
receptive to OA publishing models due, in large part, to 
advocacy by their members.  Examples include the New 
England Journal of Medicine (NEJM) (published by the 
Massachusetts Medical Society) and Molecular Biology of the 
Cell (MBC) (published by the American Society for Cell 
Biology).  Each of these journals now voluntarily makes its 
contents publicly available after a waiting period (six months 
in the case of NEJM, two months in the case of MBC).167  All 
seventeen journals published by the American Physiological 
Society make their contents openly available after twelve 
months.168  The theory behind such delayed-release programs 
is presumably that dues-paying members of the society 
benefit from immediate access to journal content, and are not 
harmed by the eventual public availability of such content.  
Though promising, such delayed-release programs are 
limited primarily to journals published by learned societies 
rather than commercial publishers.  Societies, in contrast to 
commercial publishers, serve their members through multiple 
channels, of which journal publication is only one.  As of 2006, 
however, the three largest commercial publishers of scientific 
journals collectively controlled sixty percent of scientific 
research content, and have significant subscription and 
reprint revenues at stake.169  These organizations have not, 
by and large, engaged in large-scale adoption of open access 
models, and some commentators do not see such a shift as 
likely170 (the notable exception being Springer’s acquisition in 
2008 of BioMed Central, the largest Gold OA publisher). 
 
FINDINGS, ACCESSIBILITY, SUSTAINABILITY, EXCELLENCE: HOW TO EXPAND 
ACCESS TO RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS (2012)). 
 167. WILLINSKY, supra note 21, at 6, 63. 
 168. John Willinsky, The Publisher’s Pushback Against NIH’s Public Access 
and Scholarly Publishing Sustainability, 7 PLOS BIOLOGY 20, 21 (2009). 
 169. See id. at 18. 
 170. See McCabe & Snyder, supra note 23, at 3–4. 
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4. Institutional Open Access Mandates 
Both Green and Gold routes to open access are largely 
voluntary.  That is, authors choose to make their work openly 
accessible, either by self-archiving or submitting it to an OA 
journal.  As demonstrated by the relatively modest proportion 
of articles available through self-archiving sites, scientists 
have little incentive to incur the cost and effort to self-
archive.171  Beginning in 2008, however, several prominent 
research universities including Harvard, the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, and University College London, 
began to implement policies arising from their frustration 
with commercial publishers’ unwillingness to allow self-
archiving of their faculty authors’ published articles.172  These 
policies typically mandate that faculty deposit all research 
publications into open access databases after the passage of 
some defined time period following publication.173  Such 
mandates give researchers a strong incentive to submit their 
work to journals that permit self-archiving or other open 
access release, and by the same token encourage commercial 
journals to permit this form of open access.  By the end of 
2011, more than 150 institutions worldwide had implemented 
such mandatory open access policies for scholarly 
publications.174  In many cases, the use of time delays before 
published content is granted open access status has served to 
facilitate negotiation and agreement regarding this difficult 
 
 171. This effort would include, in addition to whatever work were required to 
post the article online, an often-frustrating exchange with the publisher 
securing permission to self-archive. 
 172. For an extensive analysis of Harvard’s open access mandate, and a 
discussion of the distinction between deposit mandates (in which university 
faculty are simply required to deposit their published work into OA repositories) 
and permission mandates (in which the university purports to reserve to itself 
the right to publish all works produced by its faculty), see Priest, supra note 72 
(questioning the legal enforceability of university permission mandates under 
copyright law); see also John Timmer, MIT to Make All Faculty Publications 
Open Access, ARS TECHNICA, Mar. 24, 2009, http://arstechnica.com 
/science/2009/03/mit-to-make-all-faculty-publications-open-access/; Open-Access 
Publishing Gains Another Convert, 459 NATURE 627 (2009). 
 173. Many of these mandates, however, also permit authors to opt out of the 
open access requirement on a case-by-case basis.  See Priest, supra note 72, at 
377–78. 
 174. ROARMAP: Registry of Open Access Repositories Mandatory 
Archiving Policies, ROARMAP, http://roarmap.eprints.org/ (last visited Apr. 
26, 2013). 
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issue.175 
However, such initiatives have generally been limited to 
large and influential research institutions whose faculty may 
be less vulnerable to retaliation (or the fear of retaliation) by 
journals.  Smaller institutions might be reluctant to 
jeopardize the publication options of their faculty by imposing 
such mandates.  Moreover, the results of such bilateral 
negotiations are usually protected by confidentiality clauses, 
making the benchmarking of such agreements difficult for 
those wishing to negotiate with publishers. 
IV. FROM MOVEMENT TO MANDATE 
A. Funder and Agency Open Access Mandates 
The preceding Section describes a number of privately-
ordered open access initiatives developed by research 
institutions, scientists and publishers to counteract the 
effects of the serials crisis in scientific publishing.  During the 
period that these initiatives were being implemented, many 
of the leaders of the open access movement were also urging 
major research funders, both governmental and charitable, to 
take similar steps toward encouraging the broad public 
availability of scientific literature.176 
This call was soon answered by major private research 
foundations including the Wellcome Trust in the United 
Kingdom, and the Howard Hughes Medical Institute and the 
MacArthur Foundation in the United States.  Each of these 
organizations now requires that all researchers to whom it 
provides financial support must deposit any resulting journal 
articles into an open access repository.177  Like the 
institutional mandates described in Part III.B.4 above, these 
 
 175. See Jorge L. Contreras, Data Sharing, Latency Variables and Science 
Commons, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1601 (2010) (discussing negotiation of 
timing periods in this and other multi-stakeholder contexts). 
 176. In fact, many of these leaders themselves held government office.  The 
primary example of this close connection between the OA movement and 
government is Harold Varmus, co-founder of PLoS, who has served as Director 
of both the National Institutes of Health and the National Cancer Institute (the 
position in which he currently serves). 
 177. See, e.g., HAROLD VARMUS, THE ART AND POLITICS OF SCIENCE 265–66 
(2009); Patricia Renfro, Open Access Within Reach: An Agenda for Action, 51 J. 
LIBRARY ADMIN. 464, 465 (2011). 
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policies encourage researchers to submit their papers to 
journals that permit some form of open access release, and 
also encourage commercial publishers to permit self-archiving 
of these articles within some time period following initial 
publication. 
Beginning in 2003, scientists, archivists, and policy 
makers also began to approach U.S. and European 
governmental funding agencies regarding the need for open 
access to scientific publications.178  In the case of government 
agencies, open access advocates had available to them an 
additional argument not germane to the private sector: that it 
is inappropriate for research funded by the taxpayers to inure 
solely to the financial benefit of publishers.179  Their strong 
contention was that taxpayer-funded research should be 
made freely-available, both to scientists and to the general 
public.180  The implications of this argument are significant, 
as government-funded scientific research represents a large 
portion of all academic research conducted globally.181  
According to one estimate, research funded by the U.S. 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) alone, which has an 
annual research funding budget of more than $30 billion, 
results in approximately 60,000 new scientific papers every 
year.182 
Both NIH and Congress were highly receptive to this 
argument.  Accordingly, in July 2004, the House 
Appropriations Committee directed NIH to ensure that all 
scientific publications generated by NIH-funded research be 
made available online.183  Shortly thereafter NIH engaged in 
an informal rulemaking procedure and public comment 
 
 178. See WILLINSKY, supra note 21, at 1. 
 179.  Id. at 1–3.  
 180. The patient advocacy community has forcefully argued that access to the 
latest research contained in medical journals is of critical importance to 
patients and their families and caregivers. 
 181. See AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., AAAS REPORT XXXVI—
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FY 2012, at 12 (2012) (reporting that U.S. 
federal agencies fund approximately sixty percent of academic research and 
development). 
 182. WILLINSKY, supra note 21, at 2. 
 183. MICHAEL W. CARROLL, COMPLYING WITH THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES 
OF HEALTH PUBLIC ACCESS POLICY: COPYRIGHT CONSIDERATIONS AND 
OPTIONS 2 (2008). 
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solicitation.184  During the comment period, the agency 
received more than 1000 responses, including significant 
opposition from publishers and representatives of other 
content-based industries.  After considering this public 
response, NIH adopted a new policy185 that encouraged, but 
did not require, researchers to place the full text of their 
published articles into the National Library of Medicine’s 
publicly-accessible PubMed Central archive186 within six 
months following publication in a journal. 
But with little direct incentive to do so, and the prospect 
of having to negotiate nettlesome publication addenda with 
publishers who were unfamiliar with (or hostile to) the NIH 
policy, scientists did not submit their articles to PubMed 
Central in large quantities.187  Advocates again approached 
Congress regarding the need for access to taxpayer-funded 
research.  Accordingly, in 2007 Congress directed NIH to 
revise its policy to require open access publication of NIH-
funded publications.188 
The revised NIH policy189 (the NIH OA Policy) went into 
effect in 2008.  It provides that all publications resulting from 
NIH-funded research must be uploaded to PubMed Central 
within one year of publication.190  The NIH OA Policy has 
 
 184. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, ENHANCED PUBLIC ACCESS TO NIH 
RESEARCH INFORMATION, Public Notice NOT-OD-04-064, (Sept. 3, 2004), 
available at http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-04-
064.html.  For a more detailed discussion of this process, see CARROLL, supra 
note 183, at 2. 
 185. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, POLICY ON ENHANCING PUBLIC ACCESS TO 
ARCHIVED PUBLICATIONS RESULTING FROM THE NIH-FUNDED RESEARCH, 
Public Notice NOT-OD-05-022 (Feb. 3, 2005), available at http:// 
grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-05-022.html. 
 186. PMC, NCBI, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/ (last visited Apr. 26, 
2013). 
 187. According to a 2006 NIH progress report, the compliance rate with 
NIH’s voluntary policy was 3.8%.  Peter Suber, NIH Report to Congress, OPEN 
ACCESS NEWS (Feb. 16, 2006), http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/fos/2006/02/nih-
report-to-congress.html. 
 188. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, PL 110–161, tit. II, § 218 (Dec. 
26, 2007). 
 189. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, REVISED POLICY ON ENHANCING PUBLIC 
ACCESS TO ARCHIVED PUBLICATIONS RESULTING FROM NIH-FUNDED 
RESEARCH, Public Notice NOT-OD-08-033 (Apr. 7, 2008) (implementing 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, supra note 188). 
 190. Note the lengthening of the latency period from six months under the 
2005 policy to twelve months under the 2008 mandatory policy, largely due to 
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already had a significant impact on the availability of 
biomedical literature: as of the end of 2011 the PubMed 
Central repository held approximately 2.3 million published 
articles relating to the biomedical sciences. 
The NIH OA Policy has likely been successful because it 
balances the interests of publishers, scientists, and the public.  
Thus, even though published articles are made publicly-
available one year after initial publication, enough 
institutions seem to be willing to pay for immediate access 
that journals can continue to charge subscription fees and 
recoup their costs plus some profit during the one-year 
exclusivity period.  The continued high profit margins of the 
leading scientific publishers suggests that NIH’s policy has 
not significantly reduced subscriptions to commercial 
journals,191 nor have any discernible number of commercial 
journals gone out of business as a result of their inability to 
charge for access to articles after they have been placed in 
PubMed Central. 
Similar open access mandates have been enacted by the 
European Research Council, the UK Medical Research 
Council, and numerous other non-U.S. funding agencies.  The 
NIH OA Policy has also been viewed with approval by other 
agencies within the U.S. federal government, and in 2010 and 
2012 bills were introduced in the House of Representatives 
that would have required all other federal research funding 
agencies to adopt a similar policy.192  Most recently, the U.S. 
Office of Science and Technology Policy issued a 
Memorandum directing all federal agencies with research 
budgets of more than $100 million to develop a plan for 
providing increased public access to the results of federally-
funded research along the lines of the NIH OA Policy.193 
 
the agency’s attempt to respond to public comments received from the 
publishing industry. 
 191. See Dorsey et al., supra note 47, at fig.2. 
 192. Federal Research Public Access Act of 2012, H.R. 4004, 112th Cong. (2d 
Sess. 2012); Federal Research Public Access Act of 2009, H.R. 5037, 111th Cong. 
(2d Sess. 2010).  Companion legislation was introduced in the Senate by 
Senators Cornyn, Wyden and Hutchison.  Federal Research Public Access Act of 
2012, S. 2096, 112th Cong. (2d Sess. 2012). 
 193. JOHN P. HOLDREN, DIRECTOR – OFFICE OF SCIENCE & TECH. POL., 
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES 
(Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp 
/ostp_public_access_memo_2013.pdf (also requiring Federal agencies to develop 
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B. Vulnerabilities of Agency Mandates 
Despite the apparent success and promise of agency 
mandates, there are at least three significant issues that may 
limit their effectiveness as long-term solutions to the 
scientific publishing crisis. 
1. National Open Access?   
The principal argument made in support of agency open 
access mandates is that taxpayer-funded research should not 
redound solely to the financial benefit of private commercial 
publishers, but rather should be made available to the 
taxpayers who funded it.  Doing otherwise requires the 
taxpayer to pay twice for the same goods: the first time 
through his taxes, and the second time through the 
subscription fees charged by publishers.  As described by Rep. 
Mike Doyle when introducing legislation this year to expand 
the scope of the NIH OA Policy, “Americans have the right to 
see the results of research funded with taxpayer dollars.”194 
 This argument is attractive for its rhetorical simplicity 
and its appeal to a populist sentiment that is currently in 
vogue.195  It has also been relatively successful in marshaling 
 
an approach for optimizing search, archiving and dissemination of research 
publications).  The OSTP Memorandum directs Federal agencies to use "a 
twelve-month post-publication embargo period as a guideline for making 
research papers publicly available", though periods of different lengths may be 
acceptable depending on agency circumstances.  Id. at 3.  Calls have already 
been made to shorten this period to six months.  Comments of Michael Carroll, 
Public Access to Federally-Supported Research and Development Data and 
Publications: Publications, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES (May 14, 2013) 
available at http://sites.nationalacademies.org/DBASSE/DBASSE_083052 
#.UZKXPsocOuM.  The political will to act in this area may have been 
supplemented by a grassroots petition launched on the White House’s open 
government web site in May 2012 which received nearly 30,000 signatures.  See 
Require Free Access Over the Internet to Scientific Journal Articles Arising 
from Taxpayer-Funded Research, WE THE PEOPLE: YOUR VOICE IN OUR 
GOVERNMENT (May 13, 2012), https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/petition 
/require-free-access-over-internet-scientific-journal-articles-arising-taxpayer-
funded-research/wDX82FLQ. 
 194. Doyle Introduces Bill to Ensure Public Access to Federally-Funded 
Research, U.S. CONGRESSMAN MIKE DOYLE (Feb. 9, 2012), http:// 
doyle.house.gov/press-release/doyle-introduces-bill-ensure-public-access-
federally-funded-research. 
 195. The argument suffers from some obvious logical flaws that have largely 
been ignored.  For example, U.S. taxpayers also pay for nuclear weapons, Air 
Force One, federal courthouses, penitentiaries and containers of grain shipped 
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support for the NIH OA Policy.  However, the taxpayer 
argument introduces into the open access debate a national 
character that has not previously been present. 
The national character of research funding is one of the 
seldom-discussed puzzles of the open access model.  
Proponents of open access to scientific literature generally 
advocate global open access.  That is, literature that is 
considered open access should be available to any reader 
throughout the world without charge.196  This model reflects 
the global, open nature of the Internet (national censorship 
notwithstanding), and has generally been adopted by open 
access publications and resources across the board, including 
PubMed Central.197  There are many valid arguments, both 
ideological and instrumentalist, for adopting such a global 
approach.  But the argument that U.S. taxpayer-funded 
research should be accessible to the taxpayers does not 
support a global open access approach.  Rather, this 
 
to developing countries, yet there is no serious argument that the average 
taxpayer should be permitted to access or use these assets simply on the basis of 
tax funding.  In essence, the payment of taxes does not (and cannot, practically 
speaking) give rise to any direct entitlement to the things that the government 
spends those tax dollars to purchase.  
     In terms of intellectual property, the situation is more complex.  Works of 
authorship created by federal employees are excluded from federal copyright 
protection.  17 U.S.C. § 105 (2006).  This exclusion tends to support the 
argument that federal taxpayer dollars (i.e., those paying the salaries of federal 
employees) should result in work that is broadly accessible to the public.  Yet 
the federal copyright exclusion only applies to federal employees, and not to 
federal contractors.  Copyright in works produced by authors under federal 
contract are generally owned by the contractor, with a limited right to 
governmental use.  A contrary approach has been taken in federal policy 
relating to patents.  Under the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, the federal government 
expressly authorizes government-funded researchers (principally university 
laboratories) to secure patent protection for inventions made using federal 
funding.  
     Even more puzzling is the fact that the federal government itself obtains 
patent protection on inventions made by federal agency employees.  Clearly, in 
the case of patents, federal policy does not mandate the divestment of rights 
based on the receipt federal funding.  Thus, it is by no means clear that the 
presence of federal funding should compel the release of scientific publications 
contrary to the protections afforded by copyright law. 
 196. See, e.g., Read the Budapest Open Access Initiative, supra note 142 
(advocating the “world-wide electronic distribution of the peer-reviewed journal 
literature and completely free and unrestricted access to it by all scientists, 
scholars, teachers, students, and other curious minds.”). 
 197. See PMC Overview, NCBI, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/about 
/intro/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2013). 
3_CONTRERAS FINAL.DOC 7/23/2013  9:25 PM 
540 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53 
 
argument would tend to favor a system whereby research 
publications were made accessible only to U.S. taxpayers 
(institutional or individual), but not to foreign ones.  Such a 
nationally-based open access system (which I have termed 
National OA) would, in economic terms, better allocate the 
benefit of U.S. tax dollars to U.S. taxpayers, and would 
eliminate economic free riding by non-U.S. consumers of 
research.198  Thus, supporters of broad open access initiatives 
should be wary of the taxpayer argument and its potential to 
limit the scope of information availability in the future. 
2. Limited Copyright Permissions  
From a legal standpoint, it is important to note that 
agency mandates such as the NIH OA Policy do not purport 
to divest publishers of any exclusive rights under copyright 
law.199  Rather, these policies require agency-funded 
researchers to upload their published articles to a centralized 
open access repository, but in compliance with copyright law.  
For example, under the NIH OA Policy, authors are required 
to deposit their published articles into the federally-managed 
PubMed Central repository within one year following 
publication.200  Because the publisher acquires the copyright 
in the article, the author cannot make this deposit without 
the publisher’s permission.  Publishers, of course, would be 
short-sighted in prohibiting PubMed Central deposits, 
because much high-quality research in the United States is 
funded by NIH.  It is thus in their interest to enable authors 
to comply with the NIH OA Policy. 
Publishers could enable this compliance by granting 
authors a copyright license to upload their articles to PubMed 
Central upon expiration of the one-year holding period.  
 
 198. I address the potential for a National OA model in greater detail in: 
Letter from Jorge L. Contreras to Ted Wackler, Deputy Chief of Staff, Office of 
Science and Technology Policy, Re: OSTP Request for Information: Public 
Access to Peer-Reviewed Scholarly Publications Resulting from Federally 
Funded Research (Jan. 12, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites 
/default/files/microsites/ostp/scholarly-pubs-%28%23291%29%20au-wcl.pdf. 
 199. Some have argued that a mandate in this form could constitute the 
taking of a property right under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
and thereby impose on NIH an obligation to compensate the publisher for the 
fair value of the appropriated property.  A full analysis of this argument is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
 200. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, supra note 189. 
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However, most publishers have elected to take a more 
circuitous route and grant the author no copyright license.  
Rather, the publishers commit that they will submit the post-
print version of the article to PubMed Central twelve months 
after publication.201  This approach has several advantages for 
the publisher: it ensures that only the post-print version, and 
not the published version, of the article will be released to the 
public, and it keeps the publisher’s copyright intact, without 
licenses flowing to individual authors.  Thus, if the NIH OA 
Policy were suddenly to change or be rescinded, publishers 
could rescind any rights granted to NIH and no residual 
rights would remain with the authors.  For the same reason, 
the commitments made by publishers to authors in this 
regard are highly tailored to the specific open access policies 
being addressed, and some publishers maintain a separate 
policy for each different funding agency that requires open 
access release.202  Thus, if a particular funding agency 
changed or rescinded its open access policy, any new action 
required by the publisher would not affect its commitments 
made with respect to other agencies. 
This level of specificity, while enabling compliance with 
current agency policies, is not very adaptable to changed 
circumstances, requirements, or technologies.  Thus, a 
publisher’s commitment to upload an article to PubMed 
Central is useful while PubMed Central is in operation in its 
current form.  However, what would happen if PubMed 
Central began to charge non-U.S. institutions for access (as it 
might if a National OA program were implemented)?  What if 
the federal government, in a politically-motivated flurry of 
governmental shrinkage, transferred PubMed Central to a 
private sector entity (much as it has done with the U.S. 
Postal Service)?  What if Google became the primary vehicle 
for scientific publishing?  In very few of these cases would 
publishers’ current OA commitments compel the re-posting of 
 
 201. See, e.g., GENETICS IN MEDICINE, Authorship Responsibility, Financial 
Disclosure, and Copyright Transfer 3, available at http://edmgr.ovid.com/gim 
/accounts/copyrightTransfer.pdf (last visited May 3, 2013). 
 202. See, e.g., Funding Body Agreements, ELSEVIER, 
http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/authorsview.authors/fundingbodyagreements 
(last visited May 3, 2013) (providing links to Elsevier’s separate policies for 
NIH, the Wellcome Trust, Howard Hughes Medical Institute, the U.K. Medical 
Research Council and ten other funding bodies). 
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articles to such new, altered or improved repositories, and the 
2.3 million articles currently residing in PubMed Central 
would be stuck there unless some actor could persuade or pay 
the publishing industry to authorize this new open access 
release.  There are thus serious issues with the long-term 
viability of governmental and other funder OA mandates. 
3. Political Uncertainty   
While OA mandates imposed by a non-profit funder may 
remain in place so long as the funder does not radically 
change its mission, mandates implemented by governmental 
agencies are subject to the whim of political change.  The 
most successful agency mandate to-date, the NIH OA Policy, 
which can already be credited with the public release of more 
than 2.3 million scientific journal articles, is under continual 
legal attack by the commercial publishing industry.  
Legislation seeking to overturn the NIH OA Policy has been 
introduced in the House of Representatives twice: in 2008203 
and 2011.204  Though neither of these legislative initiatives 
gained much ground, it is not difficult to envision a political 
climate that would favor the elimination of costly federal 
document repositories that essentially duplicate and 
supersede the work of private sector enterprises.205  And even 
if legislative efforts are unsuccessful in revoking such 
policies, changes in agency leadership could have equally 
damaging effects on the viability of governmental repositories 
and the continuation of agency open access mandates. 
V. COMMONS AND LATENCY IN SCIENTIFIC PUBLISHING 
In this Section, I view the scientific publishing market 
through the lens of commons theory and compare different 
publishing approaches in terms of latency, a concept relating 
 
 203. Fair Copyright in Research Works Act, H.R. 801, 111th Cong. (2009) 
(prohibiting federal agencies from adopting open access publication policies). 
 204. Research Works Act, supra note 4 (introduced by Representatives Issa 
and Maloney on Dec. 16, 2011).  The bill’s co-sponsors withdrew it in February 
2012.  See Howard, supra note 5. 
 205. From a U.S. political standpoint, it is probably fortunate that the largest 
scientific publishers are European (Reed Elsevier—Dutch (approximately 1800 
titles), Taylor and Francis—U.K. (more than 1000 titles), and Springer—
Germany (more than 500 titles)), without a significant employment base in the 
United States. 
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to the delay period between the production and dissemination 
of a quantum of knowledge. 
A. Science Commons 
The term commons has long been used to denote a 
resource shared by a group of individuals, typically without 
significant restriction on its use or consumption.206  In recent 
years, much has been written about so-called information 
commons, a term used to encompass resources as varied as 
computer software, network capacity, artistic content, and 
scientific data.207  And Peter Suber has aptly applied 
commons terminology and theory to the corpus of scientific 
literature and, in particular, that portion of the literature 
that is available on an open access basis.208 
In previous work, I have analyzed the effect of various 
rule sets on the rate at which new information is added to 
this scientific literature commons.209  A principal finding of 
this work was the observation of embargo, exclusivity or 
restricted periods (which I collectively refer to as latency 
periods) that emerged, seemingly independently, in each of 
these settings.  During such latency periods, a publisher 
typically retains the exclusive right to offer access to a 
published work and to charge a premium for subscription 
access to it.  But after the expiration of the latency period, the 
 
 206. See Elinor Ostrom & Charlotte Hess, Introduction: An Overview of the 
Knowledge Commons, in UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS: FROM 
THEORY TO PRACTICE 4–5 (Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2006). 
 207. See, e.g., HAL ABELSON, KEN LEDEEN & HARRY LEWIS, BLOWN TO BITS—
YOUR LIFE, LIBERTY, AND HAPPINESS AFTER THE DIGITAL EXPLOSION 277 (2008) 
(discussing the application of commons theory to broadcast spectrum); LESSIG, 
supra note 86, ch. 6 (arguing that commons systems have encouraged 
innovation, specifically with respect to software, telecommunications and the 
Internet); JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO 
STOP IT 78–79 (2008) (discussing commons approaches both to Internet content 
and hardware); Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of the 
Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 379–80 (2002) (arguing that commons-based peer 
production of software has proven to be both viable and efficient, as 
demonstrated by the model of the Linux operating system); James Boyle, The 
Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 44–49 (2003) (discussing open source software). 
 208. Peter Suber, Creating an Intellectual Commons through Open Access, in 
UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS, supra note 206, at 171. 
 209. Jorge L. Contreras, supra note 175; Jorge L. Contreras, Prepublication 
Data Release, Latency, and Genome Commons, 329 SCIENCE 393 (2010). 
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work becomes available for free and open access (either by the 
publisher, the author, or a third party).  The policy settings 
and stakeholder groups involved in these negotiations are 
summarized in Table 1 below, along with the resulting 
latency period established. 
 
Table 1 
Latency-Based Negotiated Compromises in Scientific 
Publishing 
Setting Stakeholders Open 
Access 
Channel 
Latency 
Period 
Institutional 
Mandates 
Universities, 
Scientists, and 
Commercial 
Publishers 
Institutional 
self-
archiving 
6–12 
months 
Voluntary 
Time-Delayed 
OA 
Association 
Publishers and 
Scientists 
(Members) 
Publisher 2–12 
months 
NIH 
Voluntary OA 
Policy (2005) 
Funder, Scientists, 
and Commercial 
Publishers 
PubMed 
Central 
6 months 
NIH 
Mandatory 
OA Policy 
(2008) 
Funder, Scientists, 
and Commercial 
Publishers 
PubMed 
Central 
12 months 
Howard 
Hughes 
Medical 
Institute 
(HHMI) 
Funder, Scientists, 
and Commercial 
Publishers 
PubMed 
Central 
6 months 
Wellcome 
Trust OA 
policy 
Funder, Scientists, 
and Commercial 
Publishers 
UK PubMed 
Central 
6 months 
Proposed 
Federal 
Research 
Public Access 
Act (2010) 
(not enacted) 
U.S. Federal 
Agencies, Scientists, 
and Commercial 
Publishers 
n/a 6 months  
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Setting Stakeholders Open 
Access 
Channel 
Latency 
Period 
Research 
Councils 
UK210 
UK Government, 
Scientists, and 
Commercial 
Publishers 
Journal OA 
site or self-
archiving 
Immediate 
(for journal 
site) or 12 
months 
(self-
archiving) 
OSTP 
Memorandum 
to Federal 
Agencies 
(2013) 
U.S. Federal 
Agencies, Scientists, 
and Commercial 
Publishers 
To be 
determined 
12 month 
"guideline" 
 
To recapitulate: (1) in bilateral negotiations, universities 
and publishers have negotiated limited exclusivity periods of 
six to twelve months before university researchers are 
authorized to release published articles to the public, (2) 
membership organizations that publish scientific journals, in 
response to member demands, voluntarily permit open access 
release of articles following an exclusivity period of up to 
twelve months, (3) through agency notice-and-comment 
rulemaking procedures, NIH has mandated that all 
publications arising from NIH-funded research be released to 
the PubMed Central database twelve months after 
publication, (4) major charitable foundations such as the 
Wellcome Trust and HHMI have mandated that all 
publications arising from research funded by them be 
released to open access databases six months after 
publication, and (5) the NIH mandate has recently been 
extended to all federal agencies with a holding period to be 
set on an agency-by-agency basis with a guideline of twelve 
months.211 
Interestingly, as Table 1 illustrates, the latency periods 
that have emerged in these diverse settings are generally in 
 
 210. RESEARCH COUNCILS UK POLICY ON ACCESS TO RESEARCH OUTPUTS 
(2012), available at 
http://www.rcuk.ac.uk/documents/documents/RCUK%20_Policy_on_ 
Access_to_Research_Outputs.pdf. 
 211. See OSTP Memorandum, supra note 193. 
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the range of six to twelve months.  It hardly bears mentioning 
that, even at the high end, such periods are substantially 
shorter than the statutory copyright term which, as discussed 
in Part I above, can easily exceed a century.  Though 
positions regarding the optimal length of latency periods still 
differ,212 it appears that the scientific community is 
converging on a latency period in the range of six to twelve 
months.  Such convergence suggests that there are common 
considerations motivating the separate negotiations213 among 
the different stakeholder groups (i.e., publishers, libraries, 
scientists, governmental agencies, and research institutions) 
in each of these diverse contexts.214 
B. Optimizing Latency 
How can the observed latency convergence described in 
the preceding Section be explained?  From the standpoint of 
publishers, any acceptable latency period must be sufficient 
to enable them to recoup at least their first copy costs plus a 
reasonable profit.  Beyond that point, further returns are not 
required to incentivize either the production or publication of 
scientific works.215  As the latency period increases, 
publishers are able to sell not only subscriptions, but also 
reprints, thus increasing their value further.  From the 
standpoint of libraries, scientists, and public advocates, the 
 
 212. To be sure, some commercial publishers still argue that any latency 
period is too short.  This position is reflected in the recently-introduced 
Research Works Act, supra note 4.  See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. 
 213. I intentionally use the term negotiating to describe both private party 
interactions and governmental rulemaking and legislation, which are deeply 
affected by input from private interest groups.  See, e.g., Jessica D. Litman, 
Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 870–
79 (1986) (describing the lengthy and difficult negotiations leading to the 
enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976). 
 214. It has also been suggested that the observed convergence of latency 
periods around the six to twelve month range may be attributable not to any 
inherent efficiency associated with this time period, but, at least in part, to 
diffusion and the imitation of the negotiated results of initial actors.  But even if 
this were the case, there would still be great value in the establishment of a 
commonly-adopted latency period. 
 215. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 56, at 50 (“[E]ven with regard to 
expressive works especially vulnerable to being promptly and perfectly and 
widely copied . . . it is unclear that manufacturers would require copyright 
protection lasting more than a few years in order to be able to recover the 
reasonable cost of creating the work.”). 
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greatest value is derived when the latency period is the 
shortest, making knowledge available for general use as soon 
as possible.  The longer knowledge is withheld from the 
public, the less value they obtain from it (as it becomes 
obsolete or superseded by later discoveries and refinements). 
 
Figure 1 
Value as a Function of Latency 
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates, in a highly stylized fashion, the 
value (V(l)) derived from a particular scientific article by 
publishers and society as a function of latency period (l).  
Curve P represents the value function V(l) of publishers.  If 
the latency period is zero, the work will be freely copiable by 
the public as soon as it is released, reducing the publisher’s 
value from the work to zero.  As l increases, however, the 
publisher is able to sell subscriptions that include the work, 
together with individual reprints, increasing V until a 
plateau is reached at some maximal value.  Conversely, curve 
S represents the value function V(l) for society.  Social welfare 
is greatest if the work is freely accessible as soon as it is 
released (l = 0), and decreases as the latency period increases.  
At very long latency periods, social value approaches zero. 
Curve P+S represents the sum of the values achieved by 
Publishers and Society.  The maximum of P+S is thus the 
P + S 
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value-maximizing latency period (lmax).  At this point, 
publishers are likely to recoup sufficient costs and profit to 
enable their ongoing operations, but are unlikely to agree to 
allow l to decrease further.  Also at this point, the work is also 
sufficiently recent to enable society to make valuable use of it. 
The model described in Figure 1 is easily extrapolated 
from a single scientific article to the total supply of scientific 
articles published by a particular publisher.  In this case, P 
would represent the aggregate value of the publisher’s works, 
and S would represent the aggregate public benefit flowing 
from such works.  The latency period would be that applied to 
each article and would result in a similar P+S curve 
representing total value.  Likewise, a single value-
maximizing latency value lmax would emerge.  I suggest that 
the observed latency periods between six and twelve months 
described above, each of which has been privately negotiated 
in a different context, represent a convergence toward an 
aggregate value-maximizing lmax for scientific publishing.216  
In other words, these values may suggest an optimal latency 
period for scientific publishing. 
VI. TOWARD A PRIVATELY-ORDERED SOLUTION 
If an optimal latency period does exist with respect to 
scientific publishing, and if lmax indicates the appropriate 
length of the exclusivity term that should be afforded to 
scientific publications, then there are several potential 
applications of this observation in addressing the market 
inefficiencies caused by the serials crisis.  One could point to 
this period in arguing for a legislative reduction of the 
copyright term for scientific journal articles.  Such a 
legislative proposal might look similar to Shavell’s proposal to 
abolish copyright in academic works altogether, but would 
 
 216. Not surprisingly, the publishing industry continues to take a public 
position that one year is too short a period to recoup publishing costs.  See The 
Impact of the NIH Public Access Policy on Professional and Scholarly 
Publishing, ASS’N OF AM. PUBLISHERS, http://www.publishers.org/issues/5/9/ 
(last visited Apr. 26, 2013) (“In the life sciences, on average, only 60% of an 
article’s lifetime usage takes place in the first year of publication, leaving 40% 
commercial value of an article lost when it is available free 12 months after 
publication, [and] only 15% of the value of an article in American Psychological 
Association (APA) journals is recouped after the first year of publication . . . .”). 
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avoid some of the challenges of that proposal.217  
Nevertheless, as discussed in Part II.B above, the tailoring of 
intellectual property rights through legislative reform is 
difficult and uncertain to achieve desired efficiency gains.  
Likewise, the observed optimal latency period could be used 
as a basis for further agency mandates, such as the expansion 
of the NIH OA Policy to other agencies.  But while the NIH 
OA Policy has been a great success, as discussed in Part IV.B, 
such policies are subject to political vagaries and cannot be 
depended upon in the long run.  Thus, I propose a latency-
based private ordering approach to address the serials crisis 
and attendant social welfare deficit. 
A. The Role and Nature of Private Ordering 
The term private ordering refers to rule systems that are 
conceived, observed and often enforced by private actors 
through extra-legal means.  Since Robert Ellickson’s seminal 
study of the unwritten code governing the behavior of 
cattlemen and farmers in rural California,218 a large body of 
scholarship has grown in this area.  Commentators have 
analyzed private ordering systems employed by groups 
ranging from Hassidic diamond wholesalers,219 Memphis 
cotton merchants,220 and Japanese organized crime 
syndicates221 to the privately-chartered Internet domain name 
authority ICANN,222 the New York Stock Exchange,223 and 
 
 217. Reducing copyright in scientific works to one year instead of eliminating 
it altogether would enable publishers to recoup costs and continue to operate 
without radically altering the financial model of the publishing industry (i.e., by 
changing the entire industry from a reader-pays to an author-pays model), thus 
avoiding the uncertainty and instability that such a change might bring. 
 218. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW 
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). 
 219. Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual 
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992). 
 220. Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: 
Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 
1724 (2001). 
 221. Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side of Private Ordering: 
An Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 
41 (2000). 
 222. James Boyle, Governance of the Internet: A Nondelegation Doctrine for 
the Digital Age?, 50 DUKE L.J. 5 (2000). 
 223. Jonathan R. Macey, Symposium: Public and Private Ordering and The 
Production Of Legitimate And Illegitimate Legal Rules, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 
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modern credit rating agencies.224  While these communities 
vary dramatically in their composition, goals, and patterns of 
interaction, they share a single, notable trait: the substitution 
of internally-administered rules for governmentally-imposed 
rules. 
In economic terms, private ordering solutions arise when 
governmental allocations of rights have proven inefficient.  
The Coase Theorem, as it has come to be known, holds that in 
the absence of transaction costs, parties will bargain to the 
same efficient outcomes regardless of the initial allocation of 
rights.225  This reasoning has been used to argue that 
uniformly broad intellectual property rights will not 
necessarily lead to uniformity costs and diminished social 
welfare, so long as parties are free to bargain to an efficient 
outcome.226  Of course, it is generally acknowledged that 
transaction costs in intellectual property transactions are 
non-zero, and today, according to Carroll, “most agree that 
difficulties in valuing patents and copyrights raise 
transaction costs to the point that allocative efficiency will 
depend upon the content of intellectual property 
entitlements.”227  But even in the face of inefficient initial 
allocations of intellectual property rights, private ordering 
can play a role in reallocating resources to their most efficient 
usage.  As such, private ordering can serve as a robust 
alternative to governmental tailoring of intellectual property 
rights.228  In the following Sections, I will outline a private 
ordering approach to scientific publishing that draws upon 
the observed latency periods identified above. 
 
 
1123, 1135 (1997). 
 224. Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating 
Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
 225. See NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE 
LAW: FROM POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM 67 (1997). 
 226. See Carroll, supra note 98, at 859. 
 227. Id. at 859 (citing Clarissa Long, Proprietary Rights and Why Initial 
Allocations Matter, 49 EMORY L.J. 823, 828–29 (2000)). 
 228. See Carroll, supra note 97, at 1393 (“[T]he theoretical advantages of 
publicly tailored rights are minimized by tailoring through private ordering 
supported by judicial and other public enforcement.”). 
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B. The Problem of Collective Action 
As described in Part V.A, various stakeholder groups 
involved in scientific publishing have converged on a latency 
period in the range of six to twelve months.  Yet the adoption 
of solutions based on this period has been fragmented, and 
such solutions benefit only a fraction of the overall publishing 
market.  Thus, the NIH OA Policy, perhaps the most 
influential initiative to adopt a latency period, only affects 
biomedical literature generated by NIH-funded 
researchers.229  Voluntary OA policies implemented by 
member-based societies only affect those journals and 
members of those societies.230  And OA mandates adopted by 
individual institutions only affect research generated by 
researchers within those institutions.231  Thus, despite the 
seeming trend toward the adoption of latency periods, the 
benefits and burdens of this approach are spread unevenly 
across the scientific community.232 
Putting aside for the moment funder and governmental 
OA mandates, which, as discussed above, may not be 
sufficiently robust to suffice as long-term solutions to the 
serials crisis, it is instructive to consider the position of a 
hypothetical research institution, State U.  Assume that the 
administration of State U is both familiar with the serials 
crisis and that State U has been affected by the crisis through 
its own library’s cutbacks.  Assume also that State U has 
some number of faculty members whose research is funded by 
non-NIH sources and who wish to submit articles to scientific 
journals published by P, a commercial publisher.  What 
incentive does State U have to approach P to negotiate an 
arrangement whereby its faculty publications would be 
 
 229. See supra Part IV.A. 
 230. See supra Part III.B.3. 
 231. See supra Part III.B.4. 
 232. For example, an NIH researcher at Harvard Medical School who 
published a paper in the New England Journal of Medicine would, knowingly or 
not, be participating in three separate instances of private ordering with respect 
to the publication of that paper: through the NIH OA Policy, through NEJM’s 
voluntary OA policy, and through Harvard’s OA mandate.  On the other hand, a 
psychology researcher at a small Midwestern college whose research was 
funded by the American Psychiatric Association and who published his work in 
Elsevier’s Cognitive Psychology would engage in none of these private ordering 
solutions. 
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released on an OA basis?  Let us assume that State U already 
has a subscription to P’s journals.  The benefit of P’s OA 
release of those articles would inure not to State U, but to 
other institutions, such as City College, who choose not to 
subscribe to P’s journals (either because they are unable to 
afford them or because they choose to allocate their available 
funds to different journals).  Moreover, State U’s faculty 
would likely perceive a risk from their university 
administration attempting to negotiate an OA arrangement 
with P, as those negotiations could be unsuccessful and 
potentially result in P’s retaliation against State U faculty 
members by rejecting their submissions.  Based on these 
considerations, State U has little incentive, individually, to 
negotiate an OA arrangement with P and, in fact, faces a 
disincentive in terms of the perceived risk incurred by its own 
faculty.  Thus, given the time, effort and legal expense 
required to engage in such negotiations, and the fact that 
such negotiations would need to be conducted not only with P, 
but also with other publishers (Q, R, and S), it is not 
surprising that State U will generally decline to engage in 
such negotiations.233 
The example of State U reveals the classic collective 
action problem described by Mancur Olson in 1965: 
[i]f the members of a large group rationally seek to 
maximize their personal welfare, they will not act to 
advance their common or group objectives unless there is 
coercion to force them to do so, or unless some separate 
incentive, distinct from the achievement of the common or 
group interest, is offered to members of the group 
individually on the condition that they help bear the costs 
or burdens involved in the achievement of the group 
objectives . . . . These points hold true even when there is 
unanimous agreement in a group about the common good 
 
 233. See Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 67, at 402–03 (stating that in the 
case of research materials (e.g., biological samples) and databases, universities 
are most likely to act in their own self-interest, without regard to “the research 
needs of the larger community.”).  
     The counter-example, of course, is H, a large and prestigious university that 
engages in such negotiations out of a commitment to principle and with 
sufficient confidence in its own bargaining position, and the indispensability of 
its own faculty to the publishing enterprise, that it sees little risk in doing so.  
See Priest, supra note 72, at 423–24. 
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and the methods of achieving it.234 
In effect, Olson’s insight is that individuals will not act to 
achieve a common goal unless they have individual 
incentives to do so, the achievement of the common good 
being insufficient to motivate their action.  This observation 
is borne out by the relatively modest take-up of the open 
access publishing models described in Part III.  Accordingly, 
for any private ordering solution to address the serials crisis 
effectively, it must overcome this collective action barrier. 
Two classic solutions to the collective action problem 
involve state action and firm action.235  In the selection quoted 
above, Olson himself recognizes the power of the state to 
compel private actors to cooperate for the public good.  This 
solution, however, is not always palatable to the members of 
the community and, as discussed above, is dependent on 
political exigencies.  Likewise, theories of firm action posit the 
intervention of an entrepreneur who organizes and 
compensates members of the community in pursuit of an 
efficient result.  Neither of these solutions has obvious 
applicability to the collective action problem manifested by 
the serials crisis. 
Elinor Ostrom, however, poses a third alternative to 
influencing collective action in the context of common 
resources: the shaping of norms.236  As defined by Ostrom and 
Sue Crawford, norms are “prescriptions held by an individual 
that an action or outcome in a situation must, must not, or 
may be permitted.”237  However, unlike formal rules, norms 
are not backed by binding enforcement mechanisms.238  She 
explains, first by recasting Olson, and then by introducing the 
 
 234. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION—PUBLIC GOODS 
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 2 (2d ed. 1971).  Olson summarizes the collective 
action problem raised by self-interested action by group members.  This problem 
is distinct from the better-known collective action problem arising from 
informational deficits among group members, as exemplified by the classic 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game.  See generally RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND 
THE LAW 202 (1994). 
 235. These two approaches are summarized in ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING 
THE COMMONS—THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 40–
41 (1990). 
 236. See ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 121 
(2005). 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 149–50. 
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possibility of changing the norms that otherwise would drive 
group members toward their own self-interested, but less 
socially-valuable, positions: 
[t]his points to the importance of larger institutions that 
enable participants in social dilemma situations to have 
sufficient autonomy that they can change the rules that 
affect their ongoing situations . . . . [M]any individuals 
have crafted ingenious institutions that help them reach 
mutually productive rather than mutually unproductive 
outcomes.239 
As discussed below, changing norms will play an 
important role in addressing the collective action problem in 
scientific publishing. 
C. A Private Ordering Proposal: A One-Year Latency-Based 
License 
As discussed in Part I.C.1, copyright term is not the only 
culprit behind the serials crisis.  A related factor that has 
enabled publishers to exert significant control over the 
dissemination of scientific information is the transfer of 
copyright by authors to publishers.  The transfer of copyright, 
by definition, gives a publisher the exclusive right to exploit a 
work during its full copyright term.  Assuming that copyright 
term will remain at its current duration for the foreseeable 
future, an author could seek to limit a publisher’s control over 
the dissemination of a work by contractually limiting the 
amount of time that the publisher has control over 
dissemination of the work.  Specifically, rather than assigning 
the copyright in the work to the publisher, the author could 
grant the publisher a license.  A license is simply a 
contractual right to exercise one or more intellectual property 
rights during a specified period of time.240  An appropriate 
license to publish a scientific article might grant the 
publisher the exclusive right to reproduce and distribute the 
work during some period (e.g., the previously-identified one 
year latency period), followed by a non-exclusive right to 
reproduce and distribute the work during the remainder of 
 
 239. Id. at 132. 
 240. See generally Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act § 
102(a)(41) (2001) (giving a definition of license). 
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the copyright term.241 
Such a publication license (which I term a Latency-Based 
License) would provide the publisher with all necessary rights 
to exploit the work (i.e., to reproduce and distribute it) 
throughout the copyright term.  In addition, during the 
latency period, the publisher’s right would be exclusive, 
meaning that neither the author nor any third party could 
legally reproduce or distribute the work.  Moreover, while the 
license remained exclusive, the publisher would have the 
right to enforce the copyright in the article against infringers 
(unauthorized copiers).242  After the latency period, however, 
though the publisher would retain a right to publish and 
exploit the work, it would no longer have the exclusive right 
to do so, nor to enforce the copyright against infringers.243  
Accordingly, after the exclusivity period the author would 
have the right to reproduce and distribute the work freely 
and could, if he wished, grant this right to others with or 
without compensation.  Such distribution could be 
accomplished through Green OA self-archiving, a centralized 
repository such as PubMed Central, or through a Gold open 
access journal. 
One important right restored to the author under the 
Latency-Based License would be the right to disaggregate 
article content for repurposing, excerption, aggregation, 
annotation, searching, indexing, and other uses.  Such rights 
are becoming increasingly important as online tools grow in 
sophistication.  As recently observed by Jerry Reichman and 
Ruth Okediji, “scientists increasingly rely on automated 
knowledge discovery tools to mine and recombine vast 
amounts of data and literature that are flowing at rates that 
exceed the capacity of a single investigator to comprehend 
 
 241. A similar licensing proposal has been made in the Netherlands by the 
SURF Foundation working with the U.K. Joint Information Systems Committee 
(JISC).  See License to Publish (2006), available at http://www.surf.nl 
/auteursrechten/en/landschap/relationships/authorpublisher/Pages/Licence-to-
Publish.aspx (proposing a six-month latency period). 
 242. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2006) (conferring standing to sue on the “legal and 
beneficial owner of an exclusive right under copyright”). 
 243. Publishers, of course, may own the copyright in the collective work 
constituting a particular issue of a journal.  See id. § 101 (defining collective 
work to include periodical issues).  However, in the Internet age, it is more 
likely that individual articles, rather than traditional journal issues would be 
the subject of most copying.  
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and manage.”244 
Yet many online journal articles are not full-text 
searchable at all, and search engines are often limited to 
indexing of abstracts and journal-identified keywords.245  
Journals have been reluctant to permit full-text indexing of 
articles and uploading of article text to semantic databases 
that would enable sophisticated data mining.246  Instead, 
researchers are often required to identify articles via abstract 
searching, and then inefficiently scan or search articles 
individually using desktop tools such as Adobe Acrobat 
Reader.  Under the proposed Latency-Based License 
approach, authors would have the right to authorize the 
disaggregation of article content in order to facilitate 
sophisticated searching and data mining following expiration 
of the latency period. 
A Latency-Based License approach would complement, 
not replace, institutional and funder OA mandates.  Though 
the license would restore copyright control to the author after 
the latency period, it would not require the author to make 
his or her work publicly accessible.  This important 
component of the open access equation must still be supplied 
by institutions and funders that can impose such 
requirements on individual researchers.247 
While the use of a Latency-Based License by an 
individual author when publishing a particular article would 
 
 244. Jerome H. Reichman & Ruth L. Okediji, When Copyright Law and 
Science Collide: Empowering Digitally Integrated Research Methods on a Global 
Scale, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1362, 1367 (2012). 
 245. The Wellcome Trust has reported that “87 per cent [sic] of the material 
housed in  UK’s main medical research database (UK Pub Med Central) is 
unavailable for legal text and data mining.”  IAN HARGREAVES, DIGITAL 
OPPORTUNITY: A REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GROWTH § 5.21 
(2011); see also Reichman & Okediji, supra note 244, at 1425–26. 
 246. Michael Carroll speculates that publishers may deliberately limit such 
rights in order to commercialize text mining capabilities on their own.  Carroll, 
supra note 151, at 3; see also Iain Hrynaszkiewicz & Matthew J. Cockerill, Open 
by Default: A Proposed Copyright License and Waiver Agreement for Open 
Access Research and Data in Peer-Reviewed Journals, 5 BMC RESEARCH NOTES 
494, at 2 (2012) (proposing a form of license to overcome these impediments); 
Richard Van Noorden, Text-Mining Spat Heats Up, 495 NATURE 295 (2013). 
 247. Such measures may also be needed to prod apathetic researchers to 
make their works available after the expiration of the one-year latency period, 
after they have moved on to other projects and have potentially forgotten about 
previously-published but newly freed articles.  (Thanks to Eric Priest for this 
insight). 
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ensure the free accessibility of that article, the goal of this 
proposal is to effect a change more broadly within the 
scientific publishing industry.  Thus, I propose that research 
institutions, as a group, adopt a standardized Latency-Based 
License for use by researchers when publishing their 
scientific articles.  I propose that the latency period for this 
standardized license be set, at least initially, at one year, 
which reflects the negotiated (and possibly value-maximizing) 
period observed in the scientific publishing industry.  In the 
weak version of this proposal, institutions would make this 
template Latency-Based License available to their 
researchers and encourage its use.  In the strong version, use 
of the Latency-Based License by researchers would be 
mandated by institutions.248 
D. Evaluating the Latency-Based License as a Tailoring 
Solution 
The Latency-Based License that I propose in Part VI.C 
above is a privately-ordered means of tailoring publishers’ 
intellectual property rights in scientific literature that can 
replace the publishing industry’s current copyright 
assignment model.  This proposal is intended to increase the 
quantity of public scientific knowledge and thereby increase 
net social welfare,249 without unduly burdening the 
publishing industry or disrupting the production of scientific 
literature.  In analyzing this proposal, it is instructive to 
consider its potential costs and benefits in terms of Carroll’s 
 
 248. Debate continues regarding the advisability of permitting researchers to 
opt out of institutional open access mandates.  One of the principal critiques of 
Harvard-style mandates is that they permit faculty members to opt-out of OA 
requirements with little inconvenience, thus encouraging authors to take the 
path of least resistance, which often means acceding to whatever terms a 
publisher offers in order to expedite the publication of one’s article.  See Shavell, 
supra note 86, at 332.  The question of permitting opt-outs from a mandatory 
Latency-Based License structure would need to be considered carefully during 
the development of any template Latency-Based License. 
 249. The idea of a contractually-based commons is not new.  See Peter Lee, 
Contracting to Preserve Open Science: Consideration-Based Regulation in Patent 
Law, 58 EMORY L.J. 889, 917 (2009) (describing efforts by patient groups to use 
contractual means to ensure access to patents); Michael J. Madison, Brett M. 
Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, Constructing Commons in the Cultural 
Environment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 657 (2010) (identifying various constructed 
cultural commons); Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 67 (arguing for a contract-
based commons of scientific research data). 
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three-part tailoring framework.  On the basis of this analysis, 
which is described below, I believe that the proposed Latency-
Based License is likely to be effective in reducing uniformity 
costs and increasing overall social welfare, introduces few 
administrative hurdles and is politically feasible to 
implement.250 
1. Effectiveness 
i. As compared to assignment of copyright to the 
publisher  
If we acknowledge that copyright duration gives rise to 
uniformity costs in the market for scientific publishing,251 we 
must ask whether the proposed Latency-Based License is 
likely to be effective in reducing this uniformity cost.  One of 
the primary differences between the proposed Latency-Based 
License and the current regime in scientific publishing is the 
limitation of publishers’ exclusive rights to a latency period of 
one year, rather than the full copyright term (life of the 
author plus seventy years).  This one-year period was selected 
based on the observations described in Part V.B above, which 
supply the evidentiary basis for tailoring called for by 
Carroll.252  Yet, such evidence alone is not sufficient to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the Latency-Based License 
proposal.  In analyzing it further, the effect of this proposal 
on three principal constituencies (readers, authors and 
publishers) must be considered. 
 
 250. It is possible that antitrust concerns may be raised with respect to the 
collective action taken by institutions in developing and/or adopting an 
industry-wide form of Latency-Based License.  While a full analysis of these 
issues is beyond the scope of this Article, I believe that such concerns would not 
be justified, as the development of a non-binding industry-wide template 
agreement would be unlikely to harm competition either among publishers or 
research institutions, or to exert undue collective pressure on any cognizable 
market.  Cf. European Commission, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 
101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to Horizontal Co-
operation Agreements, 2011 O.J. (C 1) ¶ 301 (“As long as participation in the 
actual establishment of standard terms is unrestricted for the competitors in 
the relevant market (either by participation in the trade association or directly), 
and the established standard terms are non-binding and effectively accessible 
for anyone, such agreements are not likely to give rise to restrictive effects on 
competition.”). 
 251. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text. 
 252. See Carroll, supra note 97, at 1399. 
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It is relatively straightforward that the proposed 
Latency-Based License, if broadly adopted, would increase 
the quantity of scientific literature available to readers, as 
distribution and publication of the literature could be 
conducted freely after the expiration of the latency period.  
Absent countervailing factors, social welfare measured by 
reader access to knowledge would increase under the 
proposed regime. 
The impact of the proposed Latency-Based License on 
authors and publishers is somewhat entwined.  If publishers 
have only one year of exclusivity in the articles that they 
publish then, in order to continue to provide the services that 
they currently provide,253 they will need to recoup their costs 
plus a reasonable profit during this abbreviated exclusivity 
period.  Commercial publisher revenue today consists of three 
principal components: subscriptions, reprints and advertising.  
I will analyze these in turn. 
The largest component of commercial scientific 
publishing revenue is attributable to subscriptions (eighty-
five percent according to Page, Campbell and Meadows254).  
Even if articles become available on an OA basis one year 
after initial publication, some percentage of researchers will 
still demand access to articles as soon as they are published 
and will be unwilling to wait to access them until after the 
latency period.255  It is thus possible that the number of 
subscribers will remain relatively close to their pre-
adjustment values and publishers’ percentage drop-off in 
subscription revenue will be relatively small.  While more 
empirical research is needed, support for this conclusion can 
be found by examining the effect that the adoption of the 
 
 253. I assume that it is socially desirable for publishers’ intermediation 
services to exist. 
 254. PAGE, CAMPBELL & MEADOWS, supra note 46, at 40. 
 255. There are many reasons why researchers would not wish to wait until 
the expiration of a latency period to access articles, particularly those that are 
closely related to their own research.  The two most prominent reasons for this 
impatience are the need for researchers to cite the most current literature in 
their own papers and in grant applications.  In each case, it would be 
embarrassing at best for a peer reviewer to identify recent literature of which 
the author/applicant is unaware.  Most importantly, such an omission could 
signal to reviewers that the author/applicant is not fully conversant with the 
literature in the field, a damning conclusion that could lead either to rejection of 
an article or a critical deduction from a grant application score.   
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mandatory NIH OA Policy has had on subscriptions for 
biomedical literature.256  Existing data indicate that the 
largest commercial publishers of biomedical journals suffered 
no noticeable drop-off in subscription revenue in the two 
years immediately following NIH’s adoption of its mandatory 
OA policy.257  In fact, the revenue of the two largest scientific 
publishers in the medical field, Elsevier and Wolters Kluwer, 
increased slightly from 2008 to 2009.258  Thus, while 
publishers may see some drop-off of subscription revenue 
from institutions who value particular publications at the 
margin, it is likely that subscription revenue will remain 
relatively stable under a publishing agreement incorporating 
a latency period of one year.259 
Advertising rates are typically tied to a journal’s 
subscription base.  To the extent that journal subscriptions do 
not drop significantly as a result of the public release of 
articles after the latency period, one would not expect to see a 
significant drop in advertising revenue. 
The most significant area in which journals are likely to 
see revenue reductions stemming from post-exclusivity open 
access is reprints.  As noted in Part I.B.2, publishers earn 
reprint revenue both from traditional print reprints 
(additional glossy copies of articles that authors have 
traditionally sent to colleagues) and, more importantly today, 
one-time access charges for online versions of articles.  Once 
an article becomes publicly-available, it is unlikely that a 
non-subscribing researcher who needs access to the article 
will pay the journal for it.  Thus, a publisher will only have 
the opportunity to earn reprint revenue from articles during 
the latency period.  Assuming that the useful life of an article 
is longer than one year, and that demand for copies of the 
article will continue for some years following the expiration of 
the latency period, some loss of reprint revenue would be 
expected and the percentage by which publisher reprint 
 
 256. The NIH OA Policy requires that all articles based on research funded 
by NIH must be deposited into NIH’s publicly-accessible PubMed Central 
repository within one year following initial publication.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 257. See Dorsey et al., supra note 47, at fig.2. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Likewise, in each of the other cases cited, see supra Part V.B, in which a 
latency period has been observed, I am unaware of any reported impact on 
publisher revenue or profit. 
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revenue drops following a shift to an early-release model is 
likely to be relatively high.  However, because reprint 
revenue represents only a small percentage of overall journal 
revenue (eight percent according to Page, Campbell and 
Meadows260), even a steep decline in reprint revenue would 
not have a great impact on overall journal revenue. 
Based on this analysis, it is likely that commercial 
publishers faced with a regime in which they enjoy exclusive 
rights to publish articles for only one year would not suffer 
significant declines in subscription or advertising revenue, 
and any reduction in reprint revenue would amount to a 
small percentage of the whole.  Thus, it is reasonable to 
conclude that such a shift would allow journals to continue to 
recoup their costs plus a reasonable profit.  This conclusion is 
borne out by the observed convergence of the industry in 
independent negotiations on such a latency period.  If 
publishers do not experience significant financial distress 
from this shift and thus maintain current publishing models, 
authors are also unlikely to reduce their output of research 
articles. 
Thus, the proposed shift from a copyright assignment 
regime to a more limited Latency-Based License regime is 
likely to produce net social welfare gains: public access to 
scientific literature will increase, publishers will experience 
minor losses of reprint revenue but will otherwise maintain 
near-current levels of revenue and profitability, and author 
output of articles is unlikely to change. 
ii. As compared to a zero-copyright regime  
In assessing the proposed intellectual property tailoring 
solution, it is also useful to compare its likely efficiency gains 
with those of Shavell’s copyright abolition proposal.  As 
discussed in Part II, abolishing copyright in academic works 
would make those works available to the public immediately, 
thus enhancing social welfare from the outset, whereas the 
proposed Latency-Based License would not result in the 
release of works until the expiration of the latency period, 
yielding a deferred social welfare gain.261  Thus, viewing only 
 
 260. PAGE, CAMPBELL & MEADOWS, supra note 46, at 40. 
 261. I have previously argued that delaying the addition of knowledge to an 
information commons diminishes the total quantity of knowledge within the 
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the effect on readers, the Shavell proposal appears to result 
in greater welfare gains.  However, as discussed in Part II, 
abolishing academic copyright would push the publishing 
market toward an author-pays model with unpredictable 
consequences for authors.  If author charges were raised high 
enough, the production of academic works could be 
diminished, resulting in a social welfare deficit.  Thus, it is 
unclear whether an abolition approach would yield a net 
social benefit or cost, whereas it is likely that the proposed 
Latency-Based License would yield a net social benefit. 
Moreover, the proposed Latency-Based License has the 
virtue of preserving stability in the market and would not 
result in a significant disruption of existing market roles or 
dynamics.  A broad market shift from a reader-pays to an 
author-pays model, however, has never been attempted, and 
the results are unpredictable.  While some element of 
uncertainty is inherent in any proposal for legal change, 
assuming other factors are equal, the preferable approach is 
often the one that introduces less volatility to the market. 
iii. As compared to existing OA models  
As noted above, the Latency-Based License would restore 
to the author rights in his or her work following the 
expiration of the latency period.  At that time, the author 
would be free to distribute the work via a Green OA self-
archiving platform or via other means.  Proponents of Green 
OA might ask why the Latency-Based License is preferable to 
approaches such as the SPARC Addendum, which are 
currently in use and already reserve to the author the right to 
self-archive his or her work.  There are several important 
differences between current Green OA approaches and the 
Latency-Based License.  First, the Latency-Based License 
does more than reserve a non-exclusive self-archiving right to 
the author; it restores to the author full copyright ownership, 
with all concomitant rights including the right to enable 
disaggregation and searching of content.  Second, upon the 
restoration of these rights, the author has the ability to 
 
commons at a given point in time, making its contents less valuable than they 
would have been absent such delay.  See Contreras, supra note 175, at 1632.  
However, this tradeoff may be justified to achieve policy compromises that 
enable the creation of the commons in the first place.   
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distribute the final, published version of his or her work, not 
a less citable pre-print or post-print version.  Finally, the 
Latency-Based License approach creates a framework for 
establishing a uniform latency period across the entire 
industry, eliminating the effects of disparities in institutional 
negotiating power. 
The proposed Latency-Based License also has advantages 
over existing Gold OA models, as it would enable the current 
publishing infrastructure to continue to operate without a 
radical (and unpredictable) shift in publishing economics. 
2. Administrability  
The second prong of Carroll’s tailoring framework 
requires an assessment of the ease and cost of administering 
the proposed Latency-Based License proposal.  The Latency-
Based License is a contractual private ordering solution that 
does not depend on the amendment or enactment of laws, 
rules, or regulations.  As such, it has both strengths and 
weaknesses as compared to a legislative solution.  The most 
notable benefit of a legislative solution over a private 
ordering solution is that the former automatically applies to 
all parties within the jurisdiction, whereas the latter must be 
implemented party-by-party on a piecemeal basis.  It is for 
this reason that Carroll suggests that in some cases, private 
ordering may viewed as less efficient, or more costly, than the 
establishment of broadly-applicable rules.262  However, this 
inefficiency occurs when multiple individual parties are 
required to bargain separately with each other to achieve the 
desired result, thereby increasing overall transaction costs.  
The proposed Latency-Based License is intended to remain 
uniform across all transactions (other than in the details of 
the specific work, author and journal).  Thus, the aggregate 
effect of multiple licenses between institutions and publishers 
more closely resembles that of a broadly-applicable rule than 
a multiplicity of individual transactions.  For this reason it is 
generally acknowledged that the use of standardized 
 
 262. See Carroll, supra note 97, at 1399 (“[T]o the extent that transaction 
costs limit the scope of effective private ordering, some progress toward the 
theoretical ideal of tailored rights can be made when rights are defined as 
formally uniform while incorporating features that yield differential results in 
how the rights actually function.”). 
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contracting forms is both an efficient and effective means of 
establishing relationships between parties.263  Thus, 
individual and aggregate transaction costs under the 
proposed Latency-Based License regime should not be any 
greater than they are under the copyright assignment regime 
in place today, and would likely be less (as publisher 
assignment agreements are not themselves uniform and thus 
require legal resources to review and interpret). 
In fact, the very need for legislation to be generally 
applicable highlights a significant advantage of the Latency-
Based License over the abolition of academic copyright.  
While the legislative proposal would require Congress to 
define, and courts to interpret, new categories of material 
exempt from copyright protection (with the attendant line-
drawing difficulties noted above),264 each Latency-Based 
License would apply unambiguously to a particular scientific 
article.  There would be little doubt when or how to apply the 
license to the work, as there could be if the work were instead 
subject to a broad statutory exclusion.  And although disputes 
will invariably arise between contracting parties, courts are 
accustomed to engaging in contractual interpretation.  In 
contrast, courts interpreting a new statutory exception have 
no direct precedent to guide them.  Thus, unburdened by the 
administrative and interpretive difficulties that would 
necessarily attend the abolition of academic copyright, the 
proposed Latency-Based License would be highly 
administrable. 
3. Political Economy   
Unlike the proposal to abolish copyright in academic 
works, the private ordering solution proposed in this Article 
would require little political or legislative action.  As such, its 
implementation is far more feasible from a political economy 
standpoint than the copyright abolition proposal, and even 
than efforts to expand agency mandates beyond the NIH OA 
 
 263. See, e.g., KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING 
APPEALS 362–63 (1960) (“The content of the standardized terms accumulates 
experience, it avoids or reduces legal risks and also confers all kinds of 
operating leeways and advantages, all without need of either consulting counsel 
from instance to instance or of bargaining with the other parties.”). 
 264. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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Policy. 
E. Collective Action and Changing Norms 
In order to effectuate a wholesale change in the market 
for scientific literature and thereby reverse the impact of the 
serials crisis, a substantial number of research institutions 
would need to endorse and adopt the proposed Latency-Based 
License.  Yet, as discussed in Part VI.B, there has historically 
been little incentive for individual research institutions to 
negotiate with publishers over access to published articles.  
Such negotiations are perceived to be time-consuming, 
resource-intensive, and potentially prejudicial to the interests 
of researchers at those institutions.  Thus, despite the general 
social welfare gains that could be achieved through broad 
adoption and use of the Latency-Based License, a collective 
action problem must be overcome for such an approach to be 
successful. 
Responding to the collective action dilemma articulated 
by Olson, Ostrom suggests that the shifting of group norms 
may foster collective action.265  But how does one go about 
changing norms in the face of the resistance noted above?  
Below is a suggested approach to developing and 
implementing the proposed Latency-Based License regime in 
scientific publishing that takes these measures into account. 
1. Drafting a Consensus-Based License   
The first step in fostering the adoption of a Latency-
Based License will be the development of a broadly-accepted 
model agreement template.  Such a template could then be 
used by all research institutions and publishers without the 
investment of significant legal or managerial resources.  A 
major advantage of using an industry-wide agreement 
template is that it gives all market participants equal 
information about major terms and sets expectations 
accordingly.  Thus, with the bilateral university-publisher 
agreements described in Part III.B.4 above, institutions lack 
information regarding the terms negotiated with publishers 
by peer institutions, and each institution is left to negotiate in 
an informational vacuum.  With a standardized template 
 
 265. See supra notes 236–237 and accompanying text. 
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agreement, each institution begins from the same base of 
knowledge and can be assured that the terms offered are 
consistent and reasonable. 
Industry-specific template agreements have been adopted 
successfully in a number of different fields from online 
advertising266 to residential real estate purchases.267  In 
addition, cross-industry agreements, most notably the 
Creative Commons suite of content licenses,268 have gained 
widespread acceptance.  The licensing of a scientific article to 
a publisher is a relatively straightforward legal transaction, 
and there is no technical reason that a template agreement 
could not be developed for this purpose. 
A key element in the development of a successful 
template agreement is participation by a broad cross-section 
of the industry.  Broad participation both invests multiple 
participants in the success of the enterprise and makes it 
more likely that they will themselves be leaders in adopting 
the resulting product.  Though it may seem counter-intuitive, 
not only researchers but publishers should be invited to 
participate in the development of the Latency-Based License 
template.  Such participation will mute later complaints of 
process bias and unfairness, and will enable publishers to 
voice legitimate concerns regarding the terms to which they 
will be expected to accede.  Even if publishers do not 
meaningfully participate in the drafting, they will be less 
likely to raise claims of exclusion if they are invited to do so.  
And though large commercial publishers may be resistant to 
changing the industry’s current intellectual property regime, 
it is possible that a Latency-Based License approach may 
gain support among association and learned society 
publishers, thus weakening objections that may later be 
 
 266. See Standard Terms and Conditions for Internet Advertising for 
Media Buys One Year or Less Version 3.0, INTERACTIVE ADVERTISING 
BUREAU (Dec. 2009), http://www.iab.net/guidelines/508676/tscs3. 
 267. See, e.g., CAL. ASS’N REALTORS, San Francisco Purchase Agreement and 
Joint Escrow Instructions (2011), available at  http://www.car.org/media/pdf 
/legal/standard-forms/507939/. 
 268. See About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, 
www.creativecommons.org/licenses/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2013); see also 
Hrynaszkiewicz & Cockerill, supra note 246 (proposing the use of the Creative 
Commons CC0 license for published scientific data).  See generally Michael W. 
Carroll, Creative Commons and the New Intermediaries, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
45 (2006). 
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raised by commercial publishers. 
The process of drafting and agreeing upon a template 
agreement can take months or years, and is best organized by 
a neutral body that commands some level of respect in the 
field.  For example, a committee of the American Bar 
Association (ABA) acted as the convenor in drafting the 
Model Trading Partner Agreement for Electronic Data 
Interchange (EDI).269  With respect to a template Latency-
Based License for scientific publishing, various potential 
conveners come to mind, including the ABA, open licensing 
groups such as Creative Commons, broad-based scientific 
associations such as the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science (AAAS), and archive-focused 
organizations such as the Scholarly Publishing and Academic 
Resources Coalition (SPARC). 
One important strategic decision that the project 
organizers must make is whether one or more governmental 
agencies or non-profit funders should be involved in the 
drafting effort.  Obvious candidates would include NIH and 
the Wellcome Trust, both of which have been active in 
advocating for greater open access to the scientific literature.  
While, the involvement of a large funder would probably 
command greater attention from the industry, such 
involvement would also have the potential to politicize the 
drafting process.  Thus, the advantages and drawbacks of 
involving a large funder in this activity should be weighed 
carefully. 
2. Achieving Adoption—Nudging Norms   
Once a template Latency-Based License template has 
been developed and approved by the drafting group, it can be 
rolled out for use by researchers submitting articles to 
journals.  In order to realize the potential efficiency gains of 
such an approach, the use of the Latency-Based License 
template must be adopted by a broad segment of the scientific 
community and used in place of publishers’ current copyright 
assignments.  In effect, the basic legal model for scientific 
 
 269. See JANE KAUFMAN WINN & BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF 
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 5–62 (2004); Electronic Messaging Services Task 
Force, The Commercial Use of Electronic Data Interchange—A Report and 
Model Trading Partner Agreement, 45 BUS. LAWYER 1645 (1990). 
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publishing, and the assumptions underlying that model, must 
change.  Changing long-held assumptions and practices, of 
course, is not easy, but below are a few suggested approaches. 
i. Following the Leader   
A handful of large research institutions have already 
shown strong public support for open access initiatives from 
self-archiving to their own institutional mandates.270  It is 
likely that these leader institutions would also represent the 
first wave to adopt the proposed Latency-Based License.  
However, it may not be obvious to smaller or less research-
focused institution that such an approach will be fruitful or 
worth the effort for them.  Moreover, researchers at smaller 
institutions are likely to be more susceptible to fears of 
retaliation by publishers, and thus less inclined to use the 
new template unless required to do so.  Thus, leader 
institutions should offer support and advice to other 
institutions regarding administrative steps that can be taken 
to adopt the new approach as smoothly as possible.  Their 
example can also demonstrate that immediate publisher 
reprisals will not necessarily flow from use of the new 
model.271  Once leader institutions have begun the process of 
shifting to the new intellectual property model, norms will 
already have begun to shift in this area. 
ii. Following the Money   
Though the proposed shift to a Latency-Based License 
does not require direct action by governmental or non-profit 
funders of scientific research, funders can lend significant 
support to this effort.  Such support can come in two forms: 
general public endorsements by high-ranking agency officials, 
and express acknowledgements that use of a Latency-Based 
License would either be acceptable or preferred when 
complying with funder OA mandates.  For example, NIH 
could encourage the use of a Latency-Based License in lieu of 
the limited publisher submission to PubMed Central that 
 
 270. See supra Parts III.B.1, III.B.4. 
 271. I am aware of no evidence that Harvard, M.I.T. or other large research 
institutions have been disadvantaged by publishers as a result of their existing 
open access mandates. 
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currently occurs.272  At some point, if the Latency-Based 
License achieved significant adoption, NIH could even specify 
its use in satisfying the requirements of the NIH OA 
mandate. 
iii. Emphasizing (Individual) Efficiencies 
Absent coercion, individual actors are most likely to be 
persuaded to act to achieve a public goal if they receive an 
individual incentive for doing so.  Under the theory of the 
firm strategy, an entrepreneurial organizer will compensate 
individual group members to entice them to work toward an 
efficiency-enhancing public goal.273  Absent direct 
compensation, individual members of the group must be 
persuaded that it is in their individual self-interest to work 
toward the public goal. 
In the case of shifting the scientific publishing market 
toward use of a uniform Latency-Based License template, 
such individual incentives do exist.  These include the 
reduction of both transaction costs and transactional 
uncertainty.  Currently, every scientific publisher uses a 
similar, but slightly different, set of legal instruments to 
acquire the copyright in articles that it agrees to publish.  In 
the first instance, these legal instruments are provided to 
researchers at some point during the publication process.  
Most scientists lack the legal training to understand either 
the language or the legal ramifications of the documents that 
they are asked to sign.  Upon receiving these documents, 
researchers are thus presented with two imperfect options: 
either sign the documents and hope for the best, or refer them 
to the institution’s legal counsel for review.  The first option 
could result in unintended negative consequences, as the 
documents are drafted by the publisher and likely to take 
positions as favorable to the publisher’s interests as possible.  
The second option would add time (a drawback form the 
researcher’s standpoint) and cost (a drawback from the 
institution’s standpoint).  Even worse, the reviewing legal 
counsel might recommend (or require) that the publisher’s 
agreement be amended in some way before execution, leading 
 
 272. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
 273. See supra note 235 and accompanying text. 
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to the researcher’s expenditure of more time and effort and, 
worse still, the publisher’s possible withdrawal of the 
publication offer. 
The use of a uniform template Latency-Based License 
would reduce each of these costs dramatically.  First, 
transactional uncertainty would be avoided, as the template 
agreement would be uniform across all publication 
transactions and its effect would be well-understood by 
institutional counsel.  An institution could thus advise its 
researchers to sign any Latency-Based License that 
conformed to the approved template without further legal 
review.  Second, transaction costs would be reduced, as the 
need for legal review of publication agreements would be 
more limited once all transactions were conducted using the 
standardized template agreement.274 
3. Precedents in Law and Licensing 
While the copyright assignment model currently 
employed by the scientific publishing industry has been in 
place for decades, the use of this model is not standard 
throughout the larger publishing industry.  For example, 
trade book publishers typically seek only a license to publish 
a book, though this license may be exclusive with respect to 
certain markets, geographies or formats (e.g., hardcover, 
paperback, audiobook, digital download, etc.).275  Thus, there 
is no magic to the scientific publishing industry’s legal 
approach: it is simply the product of industry custom and 
usage, and can be changed. 
While it is true that bringing about new norms of 
interaction could initially meet resistance, there are 
numerous precedents suggesting that such a shift in the 
scientific publishing market is not beyond reach.  As 
discussed in Part III.B.1, many universities already 
 
 274. Efficiency gains from the use of standardize contracts have been 
recognized for some time.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 
211 cmt. a (1981) (“Standardization of agreements serves many of the same 
functions as standardization of goods and services; both are essential to a 
system of mass production and distribution.  Scarce and costly time and skill 
can be devoted to a class of transactions rather than the details of individual 
transactions.”). 
 275. See, e.g., Gloria C. Phares, Copyright Licensing, in ADVANCED SEMINAR 
ON COPYRIGHT LAW 29, 319 (2008). 
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encourage their faculty to utilize the SPARC Addendum or a 
similar document to reserve self-archiving rights for 
published articles, and many publishers have honored such 
requests.276  Similarly, in 2007 a group of major research 
universities and associations adopted a document entitled 
Nine Points to Consider in Licensing University Technology.277  
The Nine Points document responded to growing concerns 
over the commercial influence on university technology 
transfer practices and contained recommendations to 
university licensing officers regarding the retention of 
teaching and research rights, ensuring broad access to 
research tools and meeting the needs of neglected 
populations.278  Since its release, nearly 100 institutions 
worldwide have formally adopted the Nine Points document, 
and it has become a standard fixture in the discussion of 
university technology licensing.279 
Even more relevant is the experience in academic legal 
publishing.  In the past, academic legal journals (law reviews) 
required that authors assign copyright to them, much as 
scientific journals do today.280  However, beginning in the 
early 1990s, a small number of law professors began to object 
to this practice.281  The number of dissenters grew, and in 
1996 the American Association of Law Schools (AALS) 
appointed a Special Committee to develop a model publication 
agreement for law reviews.282  The committee’s work resulted 
 
 276. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 277. In the Public Interest: Nine Points to Consider in Licensing University 
Technology (Mar. 6, 2007), available at http://www.autm.net/Nine_Points_to_ 
Consider1.htm. 
 278. See Elia Powers, 9 (Suggested) Commandments of Research Licensing, 
INSIDE HIGHER ED (Mar. 7, 2007, 4:00 AM), http://www.insidehighered.com 
/news/2007/03/07/tech. 
 279. See Endorse the Nine Points to Consider, ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. 
MANAGERS, https://www.autm.net/source/NinePoints/ninepoints_endorsement 
.cfm (last visited Apr. 26, 2013) (listing ninety-nine signatories to the Nine 
Points document). 
 280. See generally Michael W. Carroll, The Movement for Open Access Law, 
10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 741, 754 (2006); Benjamin J. Keele, Copyright 
Provisions in Law Journal Publication Agreements, 102 L. LIBR. J. 269 (2010). 
 281. Author's informal discussions with Professor Mark A. Lemley, Professor 
of Law, Stanford Univ., Dir. of Stanford Univ. Program in Law, Sci. & Tech.. 
 282. Memorandum 98-24 from Bari Burke to Deans of Member and Fee-Paid 
Schools (May 18, 1998), available at http://www.aals.org/deansmemos/98-
24.html#1. 
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in a model Author/Journal Agreement (AJA) that was 
released in 1998.  The AJA grants the publishing law review 
a one-year exclusive license to publish an article and allows 
the author to retain ownership of the copyright.283  Other 
legal academics, including Mark Lemley of Stanford Law 
School, developed their own forms of non-assignment 
publication licenses.284  In 2005, Professors Michael Carroll 
and Dan Hunter initiated the Science Commons Open Access 
Law Program, which also developed an Open Access Model 
Publishing Agreement and promoted limited-duration 
exclusivity for law review publishing.285  In 2008, the 
directors of the libraries of twelve major U.S. law schools met 
in Durham, North Carolina and adopted the Durham 
Statement on Open Access to Legal Scholarship.286  Among 
other things, the Durham Statement “urge[d] faculty 
members to reserve their copyrights to ensure that they . . . 
can make their own scholarship available in stable, open, 
digital formats.”287  The Durham signatories recommended 
that the AALS model publishing agreement be used to 
achieve this end. 
These efforts have had a significant impact on the legal 
publishing market.  According to one study, by 2009 only 
twenty-two percent of law reviews requested an assignment 
of copyright.288  Thirty-three percent requested an exclusive 
license, most of which were time-limited, and forty-five 
percent only requested a non-exclusive license.289  According 
to this study, many law review publishing agreements 
resembled either the AALS or Science Commons model 
agreements, further indicating the influence of the law 
professors’ efforts over industry practices.290 
 
 
 283. Id. 
 284. Discussions with Mark A. Lemley, supra note 281. 
 285. See Carroll, supra note 280, at 754–55; Open Access Law Program, 
SCIENCE COMMONS, http://sciencecommons.org/projects/publishing/oalaw/ (last 
visited May 3, 2013). 
 286. Durham Statement on Open Access to Legal Scholarship, available 
at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/publications/durhamstatement (last updated 
Feb. 1, 2012). 
 287. Id. 
 288. Keele, supra note 280, at 274. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. at 276. 
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The experiences described above suggest that norms 
pertaining to the terms of legal agreements, and academic 
publishing agreements in particular, can be changed with 
effort and determination.  Thus, just as legal academia has 
effected a significant shift in the law review publication 
market, it is possible that scientific publishers may be 
persuaded to adopt new norms of publishing that are more 
responsive to the needs of the scientific community.291  To this 
end, the recent mathematicians’ boycott of Elsevier292 has 
demonstrated that even the largest publishers will respond to 
their customers (and content providers) when they demand it. 
F. Broader Implications—Latency Beyond Science 
While it is the primary aspiration of this Article to offer a 
proposal to address the serials crisis in scientific publishing, I 
also hope that the methodology and general approach 
presented herein may have some applicability to fields beyond 
the sciences that are subject to similar intellectual property 
uniformity costs.  Madison, Frischmann and Strandburg 
identify several fields in which commons of intangible assets 
have been created.293  One of these is garage band music.  
Musical compositions are protected by copyright in much the 
same way as scientific publications.  Despite outward 
appearances, there are a number of similarities between the 
structures of the music industry and the scientific publishing 
industry: both involve the creation of works by a large 
number of disaggregated producers, both are dominated by 
intermediaries (music publishers/record labels and journal 
publishers) that obtain exclusive rights to distribute those 
works, both sets of intermediaries have traditionally 
performed selection, quality-control and distribution 
functions, and both industries are undergoing radical change 
due to the advent of digital technologies.  It could also be 
argued that the long duration of copyright and the near-
 
 291. I recognize, of course, the significant differences between the legal and 
scientific publishing industries, including the fact that most law reviews are 
student edited publications that are financially supported by law schools, rather 
than stand-alone commercial publishing enterprises.  Nevertheless, I believe 
that the shift in norms at law reviews is, at the very least, informative to the 
discussion of scientific publishing. 
 292. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. 
 293. Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, supra note 249, at 657, 663. 
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absolute control over musical content exercised by music 
publishers/record labels creates social welfare losses and 
lessens content production: uniformity costs in a different 
guise. 
It is possible that the lessons learned, and the 
approaches adopted, in the scientific publishing industry 
could be relevant to the far larger market for music.  Could 
private ordering solutions—new forms of limited-duration, 
latency-based music publishing agreements or recording 
contracts—yield welfare-enhancing results?  A full analysis of 
private ordering arrangements within the music industry 
remains to be conducted along the lines that I have outlined 
here, but it would not be surprising if such an analysis 
revealed the emergence of latency periods in certain 
contexts.294  And the need for alternate models of allocating 
rights will only become more important as composers 
increasingly seek to build on prior work through sampling, 
remixing and mashing, much as scientists build upon the 
work of their predecessors.295 
CONCLUSION 
The serials crisis in scientific publishing can be traced to 
the long duration of copyright protection and the assignment 
of copyright by researchers to publishers.  Over-protection of 
scientific literature has enabled commercial publishers to 
increase subscription rates to a point at which access to 
 
 294. Eric Priest offers one possible example from the music industry in 
China.  In China, free copies of most songs become available on file sharing sites 
soon after they are released, and are readily located and downloaded for free 
with the aid of major search engines like Baidu and Yahoo.cn.  See Will Digital 
Music in China Overthrow the Traditional Music Publishing Business?, 
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (May 10, 2006), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn 
.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1469.  Record labels have been relatively unsuccessful 
in enforcing their copyrights in pirated songs.  Id.  Thus, it is reported that at 
least one major domestic Chinese music label reached an agreement with Baidu 
and Yahoo.cn whereby, for the first two weeks following a new release, during 
which labels make a large portion of their revenue from the song, search results 
for the song would be limited to links to the record label's official site.  Id.  In 
exchange, presumably, the label would relax its enforcement efforts against the 
search engines.  In this highly dynamic market, two weeks may be an optimal 
latency period.  
 295. See, e.g., KEMBREW MCLEOD & PETER DICOLA, CREATIVE LICENSE—THE 
LAW AND CULTURE OF DIGITAL SAMPLING 162–86 (2011) (describing significant 
market failures in the digital sampling of music). 
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scientific information has been curtailed with negative social 
welfare consequences.  The uniformity costs imposed by such 
over-protection can be addressed by tailoring intellectual 
property rights, either through legal change or private 
ordering. 
Current open access channels of distribution offer 
alternative approaches to scientific publishing, but neither 
the Green OA self-archiving nor the Gold OA author-pays 
models has yet achieved widespread acceptance.  Moreover, 
recent proposals to abolish copyright protection for academic 
works, while theoretically attractive, may be difficult to 
implement in view of current legislative and judicial 
inclinations.  Likewise, funder open access mandates such as 
the NIH OA Policy, though responsible for the public release 
of millions of scientific articles, suffer from various risks and 
political uncertainty. 
In this Article, I propose an alternative private ordering 
solution based on latency values observed in open access 
stakeholder negotiation settings.  Under this proposal, 
research institutions would collectively develop and adopt 
publication agreements that do not transfer copyright 
ownership to publishers, but instead grant publishers a 
twelve-month exclusive period in which to publish a work.  
This limited period of exclusivity should enable the publisher 
to recoup its publishing costs and a reasonable profit through 
subscription revenues, while restoring control of the article 
copyright to the author at the end of the exclusivity period.  
This approach would also complement and facilitate 
compliance with existing institutional and funder open access 
mandates.  The balanced approach proposed in this Article 
addresses the needs of both publishers and the scientific 
community, and would, I believe, avoid many of the 
challenges faced by existing open access models. 
 
